

ORIGINAL

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE ON AFGHANISTAN

HEARING ON FAMINE

**United States Senate
Monday, February 25, 1985
Washington, D.C.**

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5 United States Senate,

6 Monday,

7 February 25, 1985

8 Washington, D. C.

9 The Committee met at 11:05 a.m., in room S. D. 124
10 Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Gordon J. Humphrey
11 presiding.

12 Present: Senator Humphrey; Representatives Lagomarsino,
13 Ritter and Petri

14 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: The hearing will come to order.
15 Good morning. This is the first of a series of hearings to
16 be conducted by the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan.
17 Today's hearing will focus on the danger of famine in that
18 country, its causes and what response the western nations
19 should be making.

20 Before we begin the hearing I want to say a few words
21 about the Task Force itself. It is a bipartisan, bicameral
22 task force made up of Members, obviously, of both Houses and
23 both Parties, and if I may say so, of all shades of political
24 philosophy. On our letterhead, the names of the members are
25 printed. I will just run through them very quickly. In

1 addition to myself in the Senate, there is Senator Charles
2 Grassley; Senator Ernest Hollings; Senator Claiborne Pell;
3 Senator Paul Simon; Senator Steven Symms; Senator Malcolm
4 Wallop; Senator Alfonse D'Amato.

5 On the House side are my Task Force Co-Chairman:
6 Representative Robert Lagomarsino, who is with us this
7 morning seated to my left. To his left, likewise, a House
8 Co-Chairman, Representative Don Ritter. Also representatives
9 Silvio O. Conte; Thomas E. Petri; Charles Rangel; Samuel
10 Stratton and Charles Wilson.

11 The order of proceeding this morning will be as follows:
12 I am going to make my opening statement and then defer to my
13 colleagues. Then we will ask the witnesses for their opening
14 statements, followed, of course, by questioning.

15 For my part, I doubt that there are words strong enough
16 in any language to sufficiently condemn the bestial and
17 uncivilized and savage behavior of the Soviet Union and its
18 invasion of, its occupation of, and its continuing effort to
19 subjugate at all costs Afghanistan and its people.

20 Today's hearing is on the impending famine in
21 Afghanistan. We hope the testimony will bring to light the
22 conditions inside that country that could, without
23 intervention, develop into widespread famine.

24 A second Ethiopia is in the making, many believe, and we
25 must do all we can to stop it. In the last year, the Soviets

1 have implemented a long-term strategy of conquering
2 Afghanistan through infiltration, pacification, terror and
3 starvation.

4 This change in strategy has exacerbated the already
5 drastic living conditions of most Afghans. The Soviet
6 scorched- earth policy of destroying irrigation systems,
7 poisoning water, burning crops and killing cattle and other
8 livestock has precipitated artificial famine in the
9 countryside.

10 Coupled with artificial famine is the possibility of
11 natural famine caused by two consecutive years of below
12 normal snowfall. The courageous, gallant and fearless people
13 of Afghanistan are engaged in a war against a Soviet
14 occupation force that has resorted to raw terror as a mode of
15 military operation, terror that parallels and probably
16 exceeds the worst atrocities of Nazi Germany. For more than
17 five years, the people of Afghanistan have been fighting a
18 war that is all too secret and all too quiet, thanks to the
19 so far successful efforts of the Soviets to keep out Western
20 eyes.

21 More than one million, more than one million Afghans,
22 are dead. More than four million are refugees in Pakistan
23 and Iran. The refugee camps in Pakistan constitute the
24 largest refugee camp in the world.

25 Let the Soviet Union be placed on notice: the

1 atrocities in Afghanistan are becoming known; the world is
2 looking with increased horror at what they are doing in that
3 country. In the name of justice and humanity, in the name of
4 civilization, we must stand in indignation and shout in out
5 rage. Before proceeding, I am asking my colleagues to offer
6 their opening statements, I simply want to note for the
7 record that the State Department was invited to participate
8 in this hearing, as it will be invited to participate in all
9 future hearings where appropriate, but that invitation was
10 declined, I am told, on the basis that the Department does
11 not participate in hearings which are ex officio.

12 Let me say on that score, however, that the Members of
13 this Committee are drawn from, in both Houses, from the Armed
14 Services Committees; from the Foreign Relations Committees,
15 and from the Intelligence Committees.

16 MR. RITTER: And the Helsinki Commission.

17 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: And the Helsinki Commission and
18 bring with them a great deal of expertise by which the State
19 Department might well benefit.

20 In no particular order, perhaps in order of seniority, I
21 will now turn to my colleague, Congressman Robert
22 Lagomarsino.

23 MR. LAGOMARSINO: Thank you, Senator. Distinguished
24 witnesses, fellow Task Force Members and ladies and
25 gentlemen, we are pleased to hold this first hearing of the

1 Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan. Providing effective
2 humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan enjoys
3 widespread support both here on Capitol Hill and among the
4 American people. As you are aware, the Congress passed
5 legislation last session stating that the United States fully
6 supports the efforts of the people of Afghanistan to free
7 their native land of foreign occupation forces and that the
8 United States stands beside the Afghan people in their
9 struggle for self-determination.

10 The task force was created in order to ensure that the
11 U. S. government fully complies with the intent of this
12 legislation, and the issue remains on the forefront of both
13 Congressional and international attention, something that is
14 not always the case.

15 Ladies and gentlemen, in December 1979, nearly 100,000
16 Soviet Red Army troops rolled across the Afghan border.
17 There are more there now. They have now waged war there
18 longer than the USSR struggled against Hitler, committing
19 similar atrocities to those perpetrated against the Soviet
20 populus. Courageous newsmen and interested individuals have
21 traveled inside Afghanistan to witness first-hand the
22 conditions inside that war-torn country, and have emerged
23 with terrifying tales of brutality and even genocide.

24 The Soviets are, indeed, as Senator Humphrey pointed
25 out, committing unspeakable acts against combatants and

1 non-combatants alike; are destroying crops and livestock
2 herds with napalm and deadly chemicals; are intentionally
3 targeting hospitals and emergency medical facilities; all of
4 this, in the name of freeing the puppet regime of Babrak
5 Karmal in Kabul from the dangerous and subversive activities
6 of "bandits", the name given to the Afghan freedom- Fighters
7 movement by the Soviet press. The Soviet leaders are
8 determined to keep hold of Afghanistan despite repeated
9 internal demands for a complete and immediate withdrawal,
10 including annual resolutions of the U. N. General Assembly.

11 They continue to blame interference from abroad for the
12 war. In the need for perpetrating these unspeakable acts
13 against the Afghan population, it is important for the
14 American people, the Executive Branch, the Congress, and this
15 Task Force, to impress on the Soviet leaders our support for
16 the people of that occupied land and our determination to
17 stand by them and assist them in every way possible.

18 Today, we will focus on the need for humanitarian relief
19 assistance for the people of Afghanistan. To date, we have
20 attempted to work closely with the State Department and the
21 Agency for International Development, AID, to enact a program
22 which will effectively redress the present famine or near
23 famine conditions inside that country.

24 Perhaps today's hearings will focus attention on this
25 aspect of the horrible war in Afghanistan. I want to join,

1 again, in welcoming our distinguished witnesses and all those
2 interested in assisting the people of Afghanistan.

3 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Congressman Ritter?

4 MR. RITTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really commend
5 you for spearheading this effort and bringing the Senate and
6 House together on a bipartisan basis to address the issue of
7 Afghanistan.

8 I am pleased that today we will be addressing this
9 mounting crisis, this impending famine in Afghanistan. For
10 all of us who watch in horror as the scenes of starving
11 Ethiopia and children are flashed daily on our television
12 sets, the possibility that we could prevent the same thing
13 from happening in another part of the world demands our
14 attention. In Ethiopia, nature has taken a harsh toll on the
15 resources there, although the Ethiopian government's
16 disregard for the fate of their own people has approached the
17 criminal. In Afghanistan, however, nature, although the
18 terrain is rough, although supply links have always been
19 limited, nature is not at fault. What is at fault is a
20 conscious and premeditated policy at work which is bringing
21 famine to that country. But for those of you who are
22 familiar with the Soviet enforced famine on Ukraine in the
23 early 1930s, this story is compelling.

24 The policy is a scorched-earth policy. Crops are
25 burned; livestock is being killed; villages are being razed;

1 irregation systems are being destroyed; and people are forced
2 to flee their villages.

3 We have, as Americans, a moral duty to respond to these
4 humanitarian needs of the struggling people of Afghanistan.

5 (Applause.)

6 MR. RITTER: It is in our best interests not to permit
7 the destruction of the people and the nation of Afghanistan.
8 December 27th, 1984 marked a long and tragic five years since
9 the invading took place as the Soviet Union entered the
10 fiercely independent and ancient country of Afghanistan.
11 Although valiant freedom fighters continued to wage a brave
12 battle against overwhelming odds, I would like to honor these
13 freedom fighters, these people in Afghanistan, as they enter
14 the sixth year of the Soviet oppression.

15 Last year, in fact, they were honored by the entire
16 United States Congress, which my colleagues have referred to
17 earlier, having passed a resolution expressing its support to
18 the people of Afghanistan in their struggle to be free of
19 Soviet domination. The resolution called upon the President
20 to effectively support the Afghan freedom fighters and the
21 Afghan people in their fight for freedom. The resolution
22 represented a cross-section of the United States Congress
23 that has not been seen heretofore perhaps since World War II,
24 and maybe not even then, cutting completely across
25 ideological and party lines. I was very proud to be the

1 House side promoter of that resolution, Senator Tsongas,
2 former Senator Tsongas, was the Senate side supporter.
3 Suffice to say that that resolution represented a first step
4 in our Congress taking action on behalf of the people of
5 Afghanistan. Suffice to say that these hearings and this
6 caucus, with joint House and Senate leadership, represents a
7 logical second step on behalf of the United States Congress
8 and its will to assist the Afghan people in their fight for
9 freedom.

10 There is widespread support for this fight for freedom
11 and these hearings, bringing together a distinguished panel
12 of experts on the subject of Afghanistan, and their cause
13 will help to bring the message to the American people and to
14 our colleagues in the Congress.

15 I welcome our witnesses today.

16 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Joining us, after the initial round
18 of introductions, is Congressman Thomas Petri. Congressman,
19 do you have an opening statement?

20 MR. PETRI: Thank you, Senator Humphrey. I don't have
21 an opening statement. I just would like to make one or two
22 points, though. I don't think there is any question at all
23 in the minds of freedom-loving people around the world that
24 what is going on in Afghanistan today, it is the rape of one
25 people, the Afghanistsans, by another.

1 I think it is, therefore, commendable that you have
2 organized this hearing to continue to focus the attention of
3 our government and our people and the international community
4 on what is going on in Afghanistan. I am looking forward, in
5 particular, to hearing the witnesses describe the situation
6 and also any comments as to what can be done by members of
7 the international community, including the United States, to
8 further coordination and a transmittal of aid to the people
9 of Afghanistan, both in the surrounding countries, and in
10 Afghanistan itself.

11 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Thank you.

12 In order printed on our agenda today, we will now turn
13 to our witnesses. The first panel is comprised of Mr.
14 Barnett Rubin, Co-author of the Helsinki Watch report,
15 "Tears, Blood and Cries"; Mr. Kurt Lohbeck, an independent
16 producer and journalist, and commander Abdul Haq, the
17 Commander of the freedom fighters in the Kabul region.

18 May we ask that the witnesses limit their statements to
19 not more than ten minutes to allow maximum time for follow-
20 up questioning.

21 Mr. Rubin, will you lead off, please?

22
23 STATEMENT OF PROFESSOR BARNETT RUBIN, CO-AUTHOR OF
24 HELSINKI WATCH REPORT: "TEARS, BLOOD AND CRIES"

25 MR. RUBIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to

1 thank the Joint Congressional Task Force for this opportunity
2 to testify. My name is Barnett Rubin. I am Assistant
3 Professor of Political Science at Yale University, and I am
4 here to testify on behalf of the United States Helsinki Watch
5 Committee. In September and October, together with Jeri
6 Laber, Executive Director of Helsinki Watch, I went to
7 Peshawar and Quetta in Pakistan, where we interviewed over
8 100 Afghan refugees as well as western journalists, scholars
9 and medical workers, whose testimonies form the basis of the
10 Helsinki Watch report to which Senator Humphrey has just
11 referred. I am submitting relevant portions of this report
12 for the record.

13 Helsinki Watch concluded from our study that, "Just
14 about every conceivable human rights violation is occurring
15 in Afghanistan and on an enormous scale. The crimes of
16 indiscriminate warfare are combined with the worse excesses
17 of unbridled violence against civilians. The ruthless,
18 savagery in the countryside is matched by the subjection of a
19 terrorized urban population to arbitrary attacks, torture,
20 imprisonment and execution. totalitarian controls are being
21 imposed on institutions and the press."

22 I am here, together with the other panelists, to testify
23 to one aspect of Soviet strategy in Afghanistan, the
24 systematic destruction in areas whose population the Soviets
25 consider hostile of food supplies and of every element of the

1 system that produces food: land, irrigation systems,
2 livestock, fruit trees and the homes and possessions of the
3 villagers themselves.

4 Mr. Chairman, today is February 25th. That means that
5 in two to three weeks, the snows will have melted in much of
6 Afghanistan, and it will be time for spring planting. One
7 year ago, on March 23rd, I spoke in Washington with
8 Resistance Commander Amin Wahrdok, who told me about spring
9 planting in the region under his control, southwest of Kabul.

10 And I quote

11 from Commander Amin Wahrdok: "Last night, I called
12 Peshawar on the telephone. I learned some of my men have
13 come to Pashawar from Afghanistan and they told me that the
14 Soviets have begun patrols with helicopters. Now there are
15 patrols everywhere, all day, because now spring is beginning
16 in Afghanistan, and the peasants are beginning to work. So
17 everywhere they see a peasant working, tilling the earth,
18 they fire on his animals and on him, and in my region, it has
19 just started, because until now, there was snow. There are
20 four dead already, two from the village of Sashghal on the
21 Kabul road, and two others from Yamkunar in Judamnu District
22 and perhaps they will continue." (sic)

23 Reports from many regions of Afghanistan that we
24 received during our trip to Pakistan and that we have seen
25 reported elsewhere tell of peasants being forced to work

1 their fields with their animals at night by the light of
2 kerosene lanterns, because if they go out in their fields in
3 the day, Soviet MiG fighters and helicopter gunships come and
4 kill them rather than let them raise their crops.

5 Despite these attacks, of course, Afghans do continue to
6 raise some crops. Their main food, as it has been throughout
7 history, is wheat, which the Soviets regularly try to
8 destroy. Nearly every time that the Soviets attack a
9 village, they use incendiary bullets and shells to burn the
10 peasant's wheat in the form either of the grain set out
11 threshing or in the form of flour. They have developed two
12 kinds of phosphorous fragmentation bombs that can burn wheat
13 standing in the field or gathering on the threshing floor,
14 and they use these at the appropriate seasons of the
15 agricultural calendar. Now, the destruction of food is a
16 current policy. It destroys the present food supplies of the
17 population. Even more threatening in the long run, however,
18 is the policy of destroying every element of the system that
19 produces food. I will go down them one-by-one.

20 First, the land itself. Constant bombing has created
21 cratering in many regions, which makes plowing extremely
22 difficult. The dropping of anti-personnel mines in areas
23 that are used for agricultural purposes has also meant that
24 agriculture can become a life-threatening occupation since
25 these lands are often mined throughout the landscape. In

1 some regions, especially the mountaneous regions, over the
2 centuries, the Afghans have very carefully constructed
3 terraces which are quite delicate. In some regions, such as
4 in the Konar Valley in eastern Afghanistan, travellers have
5 reported that the terracing has been virtually destroyed.

6 Second, the water supply. Water is the most important
7 element of agriculture in Afghanistan. Throughout much of
8 the country, irrigation is supplied by underground canals
9 known in Pashto as karez, k-a-r-e-z, or in Persian as ganat,
10 g-a-n-a-t. These underground tunnels, which are reinforced
11 with ceramic hoops, bring water down from the hills to
12 surrounding nearby flatlands. They require constant
13 maintenance, and are extremely vulnerable to bombing.
14 Peasants find themselves unable to maintain them because of
15 constant bombing during the daytime.

16 In some areas, such as in two districts of Kandahar
17 Province, there are reports that the Soviet military have, in
18 fact, constructed military posts along the irrigation canals
19 to prevent the peasants from maintaining them.

20 Furthermore, the bombing from the air can itself destroy
21 these irrigation canals, making it difficult to use them
22 again, and Soviet ground troops sweeping through various
23 areas have been reported to have internally destroyed these
24 canals either by pumping incendiary material inside them and
25 by blowing them up or by throwing grenades into them.

1 Third, livestock. In much of rural Afghanistan, the
2 raising of livestock is an equally important or a more
3 important form of agriculture than actually tilling the
4 earth. Livestock is also the traditional way of storing
5 wealth in a country where money and a banking system are
6 relatively new developments.

7 Of course, Soviet soldiers from time to time steal
8 animals in order to provide some fresh meat and supplement
9 their meager rations. However, beyond that, the Soviets have
10 a policy in some areas of systematically destroying herds of
11 livestock by machine gunning them or shooting them from
12 helicopter gunships, thus destroying another important
13 element of the agricultural economy.

14 Fourth, fruit trees. Afghanistan has been known
15 throughout its history for its production of fresh and dry
16 fruit. For instance, one of the folk etimologies for the
17 words Kandahar is that it comes from the word for sugar beet
18 because the area around there is so sweet it produces so many
19 different fruits. I myself am an Indian specialist most of
20 the time, and I know that in North India, people look
21 forward-- used to look forward to the arrival of the
22 watermellons and other fruits from Afghanistan.

23 Dried fruits and nuts were among the most important
24 exports of Afghanistan. Reports that we have received,
25 however, tell of fruit trees being cut down and burned on a

1 large scale by bombers and by ground troops. This includes
2 pomegranates, apricots, almonds, vineyards, peaches and so
3 on. A traveller we spoke to, a British art historian who had
4 come from Herat Province has described how constant
5 bombings by the Soviet Union itself has reduced the famous
6 vineyards of Herat Province to gray dust. Five, destruction
7 of property. Of course, one element of the agricultural
8 system is the homes and property of the village people
9 themselves.

10 Naturally, their homes have often been leveled by
11 bombings, and when troops come into the villages in 34
12 regions, they systematically destroy and steal whatever
13 possessions the peasants may have, that is, instruments for
14 making tea; blankets; China, in some cases; a sewing machine,
15 in one case it was reported to us; anything that enables them
16 to conduct their lives.

17 Mr. Chairman, I would like to read to this Task Force
18 the text of Article 54 from the additional Protocol One to
19 the Geneva Accords, at that time ratified in 1977, signed by
20 the Soviet Union and by the government which is presently in
21 Kabul.

22 Paragraph 1, "Starvation of civilians as a method of
23 warfare is prohibited."

24 Paragraph 2, "It is prohibited to attack, destroy,
25 remove or render useless objects indispensable to the

1 foodstuffs agricultural areas for the production of
2 foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations
3 and supplies and irrigation works for the specific purpose of
4 denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian
5 population or the adverse party, whatever the motive, whether
6 in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away,
7 or for any other motive."

8 When I first found this text, I felt that I had almost
9 discovered a manual for the Soviet forces operating in
10 Afghanistan, since systematically have they gone out
11 violating every provision. The result of this policy, as the
12 Task Force well knows, has been to drive the surviving
13 population out of large areas of the Afghan country side and
14 create severe hunger and potential for a major famine.

15 This is probably the major success that the Soviets have
16 had in their war against Afghanistan. Part of a response to
17 counter this tactic of theirs should be the provision of food
18 and humanitarian aid to the civilian population inside
19 Afghanistan in areas outside of Soviet control. Afghan
20 refugees we met in Pakistan repeatedly emphasized this to us.
21 Depending on the local circumstances, some requested aid in
22 kind, that is, actual food aid, while others wanted cash
23 which they could use to purchase food and other commodities
24 on the market at the immensely inflated prices which now
25 prevail in Afghanistan. I should add my personal view that

1 it is important that this aid reach those who really need it
2 and that this would require careful oversight. To the extent
3 possible, our humanitarian aid should go directly to those in
4 control on the ground in Afghanistan rather than being
5 funnelled in through outside parties.

6 Thank you.

7
8 (Statement for the record follows:)

Robert L. Bernstein - Co
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February 25, 1985

The following is an excerpt from "Tears, Blood and Cries" - Human Rights in Afghanistan Since the Invasion, 1979-1984, a Helsinki Watch Report prepared by Jeri Laber and Barnett Rubin.

"In this [column of tractors heading for Afghanistan] he saw the whole essence of the revolution sweeping the country: the tractors struck at the feudal structure, at the cooped-up potter's vessel baked in a thousand-year-old stove. And the people, turning their eyes away from the wooden ploughs, from the feudal fortresses and the mosques, would watch the big-eyed blue machines moving over the roads and would connect their appearance with their own rebirth from darkness."

Aleksandr Prokhanov, "A Tree in
the Center of Kabul," Soviet
Literature, 1983.

"Because everyone who is seen on the field is bombed, no one can go out to work on the fields."

Shah Mahmud Raasir, former
Director General of Economic
Analysis, Ministry of
Planning. Interview with
Barnett Rubin in Quetta,
October 3, 1984.

Melissa Wachs is affiliated with the Fund for Free Expression and with Americas Watch. The latter's Committee for International Human Rights is Counsel for Melissa Wachs. Melissa Wachs is a founding member of the International Melissa Federation for Human Rights.

The Soviet forces in Afghanistan, occasionally assisted by Afghan Communists, have pursued a determined campaign of destroying agriculture in much of Afghanistan. Various tactics are employed, from the killing of individual farmers to the destruction of the delicate agricultural infrastructure in the Afghan countryside. These tactics are aimed, not only at spreading terror, but at destroying the food supplies in the villages, upon which the resistance depends for sustenance. Farmers are destroyed, food is destroyed, the means of food production is destroyed. Whole regions of Afghanistan have become areas of barren waste where no one can survive.

Killing of Farmers

Farmers working in the fields are frequently gunned down by Soviet helicopter gunships or jets. Those who do not flee have been forced to reverse the traditional working day, sleeping by day and working in the fields after dark.

-- Lala Dad, a farmer from Dasht-e Guhar, Baghlan, told us in a September 25, 1984, interview in Peshawar that Soviet jets usually came between 10 and 12 in the morning when "the people are in the fields. They kill them whenever they find them, wherever they find them. Rostam was killed -- he was a farmer -- while he was trying to get rid of some weeds."

-- Dr. Juliette Fournot of Medecins Sans Frontieres described what she saw during a July 1982 visit to the Panjsher Valley: "Because of the bombing, the people hid in

caves during the day, and they only came out with their animals at night to work in the fields with kerosene lanterns." [Interview with Barnett Rubin in Paris, June 8, 1984.]

- Hafezullah, a farmer from Harioki Ulya, Kapisa, told us in Peshawar on September 23, 1984: "We have to do the agricultural work in secret. Whenever the people go to work in the fields, if the planes come, they are shot. Some have been killed working in the fields, about 10 to 12 in my district."
- Dr. Patrick David of Aide Medicale Internationale told us how, during the Logar offensive in early September 1984, Soviet helicopters killed harvesters in the fields with rockets. [Interview in Peshawar, September 22, 1984.]
- Sayed Azim of Maidan told us, "The mujahedin try to cultivate the earth, but the Soviets don't let them plow. The Soviets shoot the farmers in the fields." [Interview in Peshawar, September 25, 1984.]
- "The people [of Herat] come to work the fields at night, they wash the clothes at night, they bake the bread at night. And they ask, 'What are we going to do this winter when the snow comes?'" [Nicholas Danziger, British art historian. Interview with Jeri Laber and Barnett Rubin in Peshawar, September 28, 1984.]

Destruction of Food Supplies

Wheat -- the staple food of the Afghans -- has traditionally been grown on 50 percent of the irrigated land and most of the dry-farmed land in Afghanistan. It is also the crop that has been most heavily destroyed by Soviet attacks since the invasion. As early as March 17, 1980, an

old woman from Sorkh Rd, near Jalalabad, Ningrahar Province, told Michael Barry, an American specialist in Afghanistan:

The wheat! The harvest is all burnt! And they killed our children! And on our fruit trees they threw something like containers of gasoline, and all of the trees burned down!*/

An economist now working with one of the relief committees in Peshawar told us in a September 1984 interview that he had seen the early stages of this strategy in November 1980 in northern Afghanistan, when he travelled from Kabul to his parents' home in Mazar-e Sharif:**/

"Between Kabul and Mazar was a fertile green area with a lot of gardens. They had levelled everything -- buildings, trees -- and there were mines by the road. They started the hunger tactic at that time. I saw one harvest burnt. There were only ashes left by the highway. This was near Rabatak. Later I took refuge in a tea house, while the Soviet post was firing with dashakas [machine guns]. Five kilometers from the post was a big harvest, and they burned the harvest. It belonged to a very rich man named Khoja Kabuli. It was burning all through the night, until morning. It was four kilometers from the highway -- the mujahedin couldn't ambush the convoys from there. It was just to produce scarcity of foodstuffs."

Since then the burning of wheat fields has become part of virtually every offensive and reprisal operation. Every

*/ Liberation (Paris), April 19-20, 1980, p. 12.

**/ This witness requested anonymity to protect family members still in Afghanistan.

month there are a number of reports in the Afghan Information Centre Monthly Bulletin, each repeating the same story: a village was bombed, people were killed, the wheat was burned. Refugees tell of wheat being burned in the field, on threshing floors, in houses and on trucks. We were also told of wheat being poisoned in Maidan (Wardak) Province:

"In houses of famous [resistance] commanders, they put poison in the wheat flour. This September they did it in Mirza Khan's house. One year ago they did the same thing. Last year some people died -- Abdullah and his family. Now we tell the people, if the Russians have been in the house, to throw away the wheat flour." [Sayed Azim, former government official. Interview with Jeri Laber and Barnett Rubin in Peshawar, September 25, 1984.]

Initially the Soviets appear to have used a form of napalm to destroy the wheat. Hafezullah, a farmer from Harioki Ulya, told us about a special type of bomb that "hits the ground and starts a fire." Some farmers, he said, dig ditches around stacks of wheat gathered for threshing and keep them filled with water, so that they can put out such fires quickly.

Prof. Louis Dupree, an anthropologist who lived in Afghanistan for 15 years before the coup in 1978, has investigated the specialized weapons used to destroy crops in Afghanistan. He has described two types of bombs which, when exploded, scatter pellets of phosphorus over a wide area, increasing the amount that can be burnt. One type of bomb

explodes and scatters incendiary material on contact with the ground; it is used to destroy wheat that has been gathered for threshing, drying or milling. The other type of bomb is dropped by parachute and explodes in mid-air, scattering pellets over a wider area; this type of bomb is used to burn crops standing in the field.

We also received reports of how Soviet soldiers, during offensives, destroy other kinds of food -- sheep, chickens,^{*/} eggs, oil, and sugar. Dr. Ghazi Alam described an incident in Baraki Barak in 1982:

"There was an old woman, who had no son in the house. There was only this old woman in the house, and she had to take care of the house as well as do all the agricultural work. She had a watermelon yard. And when the Russians came to the area, they didn't pick up one or two or three or four or five or ten watermelons from the ground. They took some, and the rest of the watermelons they hit with their bayonets, just to destroy them." [Interview with Barnett Rubin in New York, March 30, 1984.]

Destruction of the Agricultural Infrastructure

In addition to the destruction of food -- a short-term policy that has caused great suffering -- Soviet-Afghan forces are intent on destroying every part of the delicate system of food production. Some peasants, unable to work

^{*/} Several villagers told us with ridicule and amusement how Soviet soldiers had gunned down chickens with automatic rifles.

their land, find themselves on the brink of starvation.^{*}/

Like all peasant agriculture, Afghan agriculture depends on a complex system of balances involving nature and technology. The land requires constant maintenance to preserve proper drainage and prevent erosion; in some areas, it is carefully terraced.

Even before 1978, only about 55 percent of the arable land was cultivated in any given year, mainly because of the lack of infrastructure for water management. In those areas with plentiful water, such as the plains of the far north and around the dams on the Helmand and Kunar Rivers, open ditches are used to irrigate the fields. In most of the country, however, an underground channel called a karez in Pashto (qanat in Persian) is more common. The karez brings water from nearby hills to cultivated flatlands through a series of underground wells connected by tunnels reinforced with ceramic hoops.^{**}/ It requires constant maintenance against silting and cave-ins and is extremely vulnerable to bombing.

Before the 1978 coup there had been some mechanization of agriculture, but most plowing, threshing and transport was done with the aid of beasts of burden, including oxen, cows,

^{*}/ This appeared to be the case in 1983, at least in Badakhshan Province, according to Francis D'Souza, "Threat of Famine in Afghanistan: A Report on Current Economic and Nutritional Conditions," London, May 1984.

^{**}/ Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1973, p. 40.

camels, horses, donkeys and mules. Animals play an even more important role in the economy of the nomads, thought to constitute about 10 percent of Afghanistan's population. Livestock is an important element -- extensive herds of sheep and goats produce milk and meat and the wool that is used for clothing, carpets and tents. They are also a major way of storing wealth. Fruit trees and vines are another major part of Afghan agriculture, requiring years to reach maturity and careful watering and pruning to survive and keep yields high. Finally, there are the homes, social institutions and possessions of the villagers themselves: a roof to shelter them, a mosque for prayer, a blanket for winter, a Koran for study, a pot to boil water for rice and tea, and a stove to bake bread.

"The Russians killed the animals, stole our watches and money, and burned the wheat with BM-13s." "They bombed the residences and mosques, shot whoever was working in the fields from planes, burned the harvest, destroyed gardens of grapes and peaches with bombs, killed animals, even the chickens, took all our expensive possessions like watches and tape recorders, and tore up the Holy Koran." [Refugees from Ningrahar and Kapisa, interviewed by Jeri Laber and Barnett Rubin in Peshawar, September 23 and 24, 1984.]

The Soviet-Afghan forces have systematically attacked every portion of the agricultural system.

Irrigation and Terracing:

- Pal Hougen of the Norwegian Afghanistan Committee saw the destruction of terracing during his July-August 1982 visit to the Bashgul Valley of Kunar Province: "The irrigation system was disturbed by rockets, and so were the terraces, built through 100 generations to make this landscape fitted for men to live in."^{*}/
- A recent article in the Afghan Information Centre Monthly Bulletin described extensive damage to irrigation systems from bombing, as well as a number of cases where Soviet ground troops destroyed karezes with grenades.^{**}/
- People from Maiwand and Sangsar Districts of Kandahar reported that the Soviets had established military posts along the irrigation canals, preventing the residents from repairing or using them.^{***}/
- "When the Russians came last year, they destroyed the karezes. They put bombs in them to destroy them. This year they are doing the same thing, for instance, in Busragh Village." [Sayed Azim, former government official. Interview with Jeri Laber and Barnett Rubin in Peshawar, September 25, 1984.]

^{*}/ "International Afghanistan Hearing, Final Report, Oslo, March 13-16, 1983," published February 1984. The original tape recordings have been deposited with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

^{**}/ July 1984, pp. 3-6.

^{***}/ Ibid.

Animals:

- "When we passed Salang, at Kilagai, there were gunships, fuel reserves, tanks, and troops. Just before we reached there, a flock was grazing. Two APCs came and started firing, and the sheep of the flock were falling on the ground. One of them, I remember, had two bullets in the neck, and the blood was gushing out."*/
- French journalist Alain Chevalieras saw cattle destroyed by helicopters in the Sholgarah Valley of Balkh Province. [Interview with Jeri Laher and Barnett Rubin in Peshawar, September 22, 1984.]
- Lala Dad, a farmer from Baghlan, showed us documentation of a recent bombing raid in which 118 horses and mules were killed in his village. [Interview in Peshawar, September 25, 1984.]
- Hafezullah and Kefayatullah, of Kapisa, women from Kohistan, Kapisa Province and refugees from Batikot District of Ningrahar described how Soviet soldiers during raids had killed sheep, cows, and other animals. [Interviews with Jeri Laher and Barnett Rubin in Peshawar, September 23 and 25, 1984.]
- Sayed Azim told us that in Maidan, whenever Soviet-Afghan convoys come through on the road to Ghazni and Kandahar, helicopters accompany them and shoot at the animals, whether there is fighting or not. [Interview in Peshawar, September 25, 1984.]
- "Soviet armored helicopters systematically machine-gun the villages and herds within a radius of 30 to 50 kilometers of the Soviet base at Chaghcharan, especially in the winter, when the flocks are concentrated in the stables."**/

*/ Economist previously quoted (name withheld on request).

**/ Olivier Roy, Les Nouvelles d'Afghanistan, October-November 1983, p. 12.

Fruit Trees: A grim photograph of the Afghan war shows a turbaned man holding an antique rifle, surrounded by an arid field filled with the cut-off stumps of apricot and almond trees. It was taken north of Kandahar in the fall of 1982, where a representative of Amitie Franco-Afghane (AFRANE) was told that government troops had cut off the trees at a height of 30 centimeters in the autumn of 1980.*/

- Refugees from Shomali, the fertile plain north of Kabul, told us on September 23, 1984, how bombing had destroyed vineyards and fruit orchards in that region.
- Sayed Azim described the destruction of the apple orchards of Maidan (Wardak): "All the fruit trees are cut down. They cut them down when they shoot everywhere with bullets or BM-13s." [Interview with Jeri Laber and Barnett Rubin in Peshawar, September 25, 1984.]
- "The Soviets are cutting down fruit trees in Kandahar. In the very place where the prison is located they cut 5 or 6 very good fruit trees -- apples, pomegranates, apricots -- just because the mujahedin may hide behind trees and attack them." [Shah Mahmud Raasir, economist. Interview with Barnett Rubin in Quetta, October 3, 1984.]
- The Afghan Information Centre in its July 1984 Monthly Bulletin described how the famous vines and fruit trees of Kandahar Province are dying for lack of water, as a result of damage to the irrigation systems.

*/ Les Nouvelles d'Afghanistan, December 1982, cover and p. 16.

Theft of Property

Perhaps the most direct method of forcing peasants off their land is simply to take away whatever they have.

Michael Barry told the Afghanistan Hearings in Oslo of a village in Logar:

"[In November 1982] I saw an enormous village by moonlight which had not been bombed, and yet there is not a single human being left alive in it. It was already snowing, and you could tell that there were no footsteps in the snow. It was a freezing night, and with my companions I explored the village, and all we found living in the village was a single dog. One month later I was able to track down the people who had originally lived in this village in a Pakistan refugee camp, and they explained their story On August 30, 1982, the village was surrounded in the classical way by tanks, helicopters flying above. Young men of military age had been able to run away into the mountains on time, so all the people who were collected by the Soviet troops were elderly villagers, farmers, women, and children. The soldiers did not kill anybody this time, they simply stripped every single person in the village that they could lay their hands on of anything valuable he had on, whether jewelry or wristwatches. Houses were searched, and all transistor radios were confiscated. The granaries were emptied, all sacks of grain reloaded onto the military vehicles, and finally all the sheep, all the goats, all the cattle were loaded onto military lorries and taken away. By nightfall the population of Aochakan [Ah-e Chakan in standard Persian] had to take stock of the fact that they had nothing left with which to survive the coming winter. An assembly was held that evening. It was feared that the Soviets could come back this time to pressgang the young men into service, and it was decided that the best thing for the villagers to do would be to abandon everything and go to Pakistan."*/

*/ "International Afghanistan Hearing," op. cit., p. 195.

Afghan villagers we interviewed in Peshawar in September 1984 described systematic theft and destruction of property by Soviet soldiers sweeping through their villages.

- Ribi Makhro of Chardara, Kunduz, told how Soviet soldiers had stolen sewing machines, watches and money.
- Lala Dad of Baghlan said that Soviet soldiers "broke china and all expensive possessions."
- Kefayatullah of Kapisa said the Russians "took all the expensive things, tapes, watches, cash money, and fruits. They walked up to old men and said, 'Give us bakhshish [alms or a bribe].'" He added, "They also burned the mosque and tore apart the Holy Koran. They tore up my own copy of the Holy Koran! I found the torn pages in my house."*/
- A woman from Kapisa told us: "The Russians came while I was cooking dinner. They asked, 'Where is your husband?' They broke dishes and glasses, killed animals, and burned the rugs."

This is not the first time an invader has used these tactics in Afghanistan. In the thirteenth century Genghis Khan swept through the country, leaving silted irrigation canals and devastated cities as his monuments.**/ There is

*/ There are other accounts of the deliberate profanation of Muslim symbols. Edward Girardet reported seeing a mosque in Dasht-e Rawat, Panjsher, that Soviet soldiers had used as a latrine. U.S. News and World Report, October 15, 1984, p. 44.

**/ Dupree, Afghanistan, op. cit., p. 316.

an ominous resemblance between the devastation of Genghis Khan and what we are hearing today in descriptions such as one we received from Dr. Juliette Fournot of a village in the Panjsher Valley:

In the village you could not find one house intact. No doors, nothing left; just walls were standing. It was smelling horrible, of dead bodies. It was smelling of death. It was the season of the apricots. Apricots were all falling down, and there was nobody to pick them. And everywhere there was . . . putrefaction.

1 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Thank you, Mr. Rubin. Let us
2 receive the statement of each of our witnesses, and then we
3 will proceed to questioning.

4 Mr. Lohbeck?

5
6 **STATEMENT OF KURT LOHBECK, INDEPENDENT PRODUCER**
7 **AND JOURNALIST**

8 Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you and the members of
9 this ad hoc Committee for the opportunity to share my recent
10 experiences inside of Afghanistan. I am the Executive
11 Producer of T. V. Documentaries International, an independent
12 television production company which has been contracted to
13 American television networks for the past two years for news
14 coverage in the Middle East and Afghanistan. In this
15 capacity, I have made three trips inside Afghanistan within
16 the past fourteen months.

17 It has now been over five years since the Soviet Army
18 moved in force into the country. The last five years have
19 been marked by a valiant and determined opposition to this
20 invasion by the people of Afghanistan. I have come to
21 believe that the resistance was much bigger and continues to
22 be much bigger and stronger than the Soviets originally
23 expected.

24 In fact, the Mujahaddin, the resistance forces, have now
25 been fighting the Soviets for a year longer than they fought

1 the German Army in World War II. However, while we cheer
2 them on and hope their fight for self-determination and
3 freedom is successful, let us not fool ourselves that they
4 are winning militarily, and let us not delude them into
5 believing they can force the Soviets into a political
6 solution unless the western world backs up their words with
7 tangible help.

8 While our statements of support for the people of
9 Afghanistan help to encourage their already extremely high
10 morale, our lack of providing the help that is really needed
11 to save this country from total genocide is increasing their
12 frustration.

13 In November of 1983, I made my first trip with the
14 Mujahaddin freedom fighters into Afghanistan. We walked
15 across the mountains and visited numerous towns and villages.
16 In every settlement, the people would welcome the Mujahaddin
17 as saviors and heroes. They would give us food and tea and a
18 place to rest and sleep.

19 In addition, they would provide the Mujahaddin with
20 much-needed information on Soviet and Communist Afghan
21 military movements and operations. It was obvious to us that
22 the Mujahaddin were not separate from the general population.
23 Rather, nearly everyone in Afghanistan that we met were
24 contributing to the effort to fight the foreign invaders.

25 Fourteen months ago, the freedom fighters were armed

1 with old Enfield 303 rifles, AK-47 Kalashnikov automatic
2 rifles, Nashka machine guns, which have been captured, and a
3 variety of small arms, most of which had Chinese markings.
4 These included RPGs, or rocket propelled grenades, which were
5 the highest powered weapons they had. They had no
6 anti-aircraft weapons, but rather, attempted to shoot down
7 high-flying SU-25 and MiG aircraft and HIND-24 helicopters
8 with Dashika machine guns, unsuccessfully, as the aircraft in
9 Afghanistan fly higher than the range of such weapons. On
10 this first trip, we saw several examples of Soviet bombing
11 techniques, villages which had been partially destroyed and
12 some fields that had been napalmed and burned. We saw people
13 who had been injured by shrapnel but continued to work their
14 field or herd their animals. The country's food supplies
15 were adequate fourteen months ago, and normal life continued,
16 despite the difficulty of the war which raged around them.

17 Our second trip was in the spring of 1984. The
18 experience in a different area of the country was much the
19 same. People welcomed us, fed us, give us information and a
20 place to sleep. The evidence of bombing and occasional
21 Soviet infantry operations was all around us, but it appeared
22 that while the motive of such activity against the villages
23 might have been to break the support of the people for the
24 resistance, the exact opposite was taking place. They were
25 infuriated, and their resolve as seen by us was strengthened.

1 The armaments of the Mujahaddin were at the same low level.
2 but they were encouraged by the remarkable successes they had
3 achieved against the Soviets on the ground.

4 Our third trip in November and December of 1984 was much
5 different. We crossed the mountains from Pakistan and walked
6 through three different provinces of Afghanistan right up to
7 the City of Kabul. We went through dozens of villages on
8 this trip, but the people did not welcome us; did not give us
9 food; and for 21 days, we did not have a bed to sleep on.
10 There were no people. The villages were bombed out ruins.
11 The farms were dead, with the irrigation systems destroyed.
12 We ate a diet of turnips and wild onions, the only food still
13 growing after the helicopters had finished. The people, with
14 few exceptions, had fled. There has been much talk recently
15 of famine in Afghanistan, and I can attest after a three-week
16 diet of turnips, that food is scarce. But it is not a
17 natural disaster; it is a disaster caused by 500- pound bombs
18 and a policy of population elimination.

19 We took considerable videotape of one village where
20 Soviet commandos had raided just two days before our arrival.
21 The village was littered with the bodies of over 250 dead
22 camels, cows, goats and dogs. The Soviet commandos had
23 destroyed all food supplies. Mr. Chairman, Members of this
24 Committee, I would like to show you a map of Afghanistan, and
25 I believe you each have a copy of it. If not, I have some

1 others. It has areas marked in many different sections of
2 the country. These markings and the information was obtained
3 from the various Mujahaddin leaders from our own eye witness
4 reports and from sources of the Pakistani and the American
5 government. The markings denote where the heaviest and most
6 continuous fighting has occurred in the last five years. The
7 concentration is around the city of Kabul, the Pansjer
8 Valley, the region around Khandahar, and the areas leading up
9 to the City of Herat. Each of these areas marked are the
10 most important strategic areas of the country. The
11 Mujahaddin know it, and the Soviets know it, which is why
12 these areas are the scene of combat.

13 I would now like to show you a second map, which has
14 been prepared by a Afrane, MSF and Guilde De Raid, three
15 French organizations which have been working courageously in
16 support of the people of Afghanistan. This map is marked
17 with stars which denote the areas of the highest incidence
18 and the risk of famine in 1984 and projected into 1985. If
19 you will compare the two maps, you will find that it is no
20 coincidence that they are exactly the same. The Soviets are
21 systematically and deliberately destroying the infrastructure
22 of the country which supports the population who, in turn,
23 support the resistance fighters. The last eight months have
24 seen dramatic increases in this form of starvation warfare.
25 By eliminating the food supplies, the people must leave. By

1 causing the people to leave, the most important support to
2 the freedom fighters is eliminated.

3 On our way out of the country in December of this last
4 year, we traveled through severe winter weather, heavy snow,
5 below zero temperatures and brutal high mountain winds. Yet
6 we were constantly in sight of refugees fleeing the country
7 carrying their few possessions. Some were barefoot. Many
8 were old, yet trudging through the snow. All were hungry,
9 and every one we talked with were determined to fight with
10 every last drop of blood against the invaders who were taking
11 over their country.

12 They do not fear death but are determined not to submit
13 to viciousness of the Soviet Army. On this trip, the the
14 only addition to the Mujahiddin arsenal were a few SAH-7
15 heat-seeking anti- aircraft missiles. Most were defective,
16 skittering a few yards from their lunches and falling to the
17 ground. When one was successfully launched, the Soviet
18 pilots would release phosphorous flares which would divert
19 the missiles to harmless explosions. We accompanied the
20 Mujahaddin on a daring raid on the road leading out of Kabul
21 to Jalalabad. They attacked Soviet tanks on the road with
22 mortars and RPGs. While they were successful in closing the
23 road for a short period of time, the rockets merely bounced
24 off the tanks like ping-pong balls. Their skill in
25 infiltrating the country and reaching well-fortified areas

1 was and is tremendous. They are able to move in and out of
2 the city of Kabul at will. They are everywhere in the
3 mountaneous countryside. They have no defense against the
4 helicopters and aircraft which are systematically eliminating
5 the population in the countryside.

6 Mr. Chairman, the leaders and the commanders of the
7 Mujahaddin have told me they know they cannot defeat the
8 Soviet Army. They know that they do not have the equipment
9 to be a match for the Soviet military machine. They hope
10 against hope that they will be able to inflict enough damage
11 and enough cost upon the Soviets to require them to rethink
12 their situation and bring about a political solution, a
13 solution which requires a complete Soviet withdrawal from
14 Afghanistan.

15 They hear some arguments against the United States and
16 other western countries providing them with the equipment
17 which is necessary to cause such costly harm to the Soviets.
18 arguments such as "millions of dollars don't accomplish much."
19 or that we would merely be giving them enough to fight and
20 die and a condemnation to a slow death. They totally reject
21 such arguments. First of all, they are fighting and dying
22 now and are not about to quit. Such statements such as
23 "fighting to the last man" may sound like so much rhetoric to
24 you, but believe me when I tell you I have seen it to be
25 true. There are various reports at times of \$250 million of

1 U. S. aid being provided to the Mujahaddin. I cannot tell
2 you the cost of boxes of pre-World War II Enfield rifles or
3 Chinese RPGs, but if it's \$250 million, it could be more
4 effectively spent trying to save the life of a country of
5 people who want to determine their own destiny with
6 individual liberty and freedom of religion. The people of
7 Afghanistan were heartend last year when the Congress of the
8 United States overwhelmingly passed a resolution calling upon
9 this government to effectively assist them.

10 So far, that resolution is just words on paper. The
11 people of Afghanistan are continuing to die by the thousands
12 each month, and they are beginning to think that to us, these
13 events are just occasional and indifferent news reports.

14 Television reports and visuals of this genocide
15 infrequent, not because of any unwillingness of western news
16 organizations to cover them, but because of the difficulty
17 and the danger of obtaining them. Just prior to our last
18 trip, a French television reporter was captured by the KGB in
19 Afghanistan, tried and sentenced to 18 years for spying.

20 Vigorous efforts by the French government eventually
21 obtained his release. Upon his release, the Soviet
22 Ambassador to Pakistan publicly stated that the next western
23 journalist caught in Afghanistan would be shot. I have
24 talked with American and European television people who
25 cancelled plans to go to Afghanistan as a result of this

1 statement.

2 The Soviets are attempting to prevent us in the western
3 world from seeing what atrocities they are committing in
4 Afghanistan. We proudly proclaim that mankind is endowed by
5 their creator with certain unalienable right. Among these
6 are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The people
7 of Afghanistan are showing by their incredible opposition to
8 Soviet domination that they also believe this applies to
9 them, not just Americans.

10 Mr. Chairman, at the request of the staff of this
11 committee, I prepared a videotaped example of what I have
12 been talking about, and I have brought the Mujahaddin
13 Commander for the Kabul front. Abdul Haq, one of the most
14 respected of all the resistance commanders, can tell you how
15 his people are living and dying. And it is my hope that you
16 do more than just listen. If we do not do more, then
17 Afghanistan will be relegated to being a country that once
18 was.

19 I thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee.
20 After you hear from Abdul Haq, I would like to show you the
21 short videotape which we prepared for you for this hearing.
22

23 **STATEMENT OF COMMANDER ABDUL HAQ, AFGHAN**
24 **COMMANDER OF THE KABUL REGION**

25 **CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY:** Commander Haq, a special welcome to

1 you. We are honored to have you with us this morning. Will
2 you proceed, please?

3 COMMANDER ABDUL HAQ: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much
4 for the Chairman and all the Senate and the people who are
5 here. I would like to just talk for some time about what we
6 had a problem in Afghanistan, what we are facing there.
7 Maybe my English is not good enough, but I just--

8 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: It's fine. Will you pull the
9 microphone just a little closer, please? Thank you.

10 COMMANDER ABDUL HAQ: When the Soviet invaded, first
11 invaded Afghanistan in the beginning, they tried to make
12 happier people and they say, "We are going to give you food
13 or medicine that will cure and the roads and this and this
14 and this" to make them happy so people accept them. But the
15 people said, "We don't need your road and we don't need your
16 food and we don't need your building. We don't need
17 anything, we just need our freedom. We just want to be
18 free." The Soviet accept the people not accept us in the
19 start kept killing people from village to village, five
20 people from one village and six people from another village
21 and ten people from another village Some of them are killed,
22 and some of them they put them in jail for a long time.

23 But still people continue to work instead of doing
24 something against the Soviet Union, and also the Soviets
25 think the people are not going to be afraid just small

1 bombing in the villages and countryside with tanks or
2 helicopters or with jets and killing people in one place and
3 another place and another place so people are afraid of the
4 Soviet tanks and Soviet helicopters and Soviet commanders and
5 to be cooperate with their government.

6 But still people, we do not afraid from the tanks and
7 helicopters, but, "We don't like you in Afghanistan and we
8 are willing to fight with you forever."

9 Then the Soviet starts to push the people from the
10 economic side, which is take job from the people, destroy
11 their agriculture; and anyway, the people of Afghanistan is
12 not very much people to save some money in the bank and the
13 use this money from one or two or five years, but work daily
14 and spend it tonight. From one side, the side of the
15 economy, from another side, the everything we make five or
16 six time expensive.

17 The people have nothing to eat and a place to go to ask
18 help. We say, we have nothing to eat and the government will
19 help them by some condition.

20 But still people continue and say, we don't care, about
21 food and we don't care about anything. We are going to
22 fight.

23 Then the Soviets find out these people are not useful
24 any more for them because the people not afraid of the tank
25 and helicopters, and we be not afraid of the economy problem.

1 We don't want them there. Then they start huge bombing in
2 the countryside and the villageside. They come with 20, 30
3 helicopters and they just decide to destroy everything. In
4 my idea, why we are in trouble with the Soviet, we do not
5 have a government. We do not have a money. We are not--we
6 do not have too much industrial to be for the Soviet. I
7 think for the Soviet to defeat American is interesting; for
8 the Soviet to defeat Europe is interesting; for the American
9 just to use Afghanistan like a buys or to go to this Indian
10 Ocean or just to kept the energy at the Gulf could be a
11 defeat of another country or else it could be broke the line
12 of a transport from the world from one side to another side
13 of the world.

14 We think otherwise, the freedom, the Soviet is across
15 the border and and attacks us and kills my people and
16 children and women. And in addition, like the witness has
17 said and was explaining and people such as the journalist,
18 because I don't want to go into too far in these things, but
19 mostly, we really think our people, are alone in this war.
20 Nobody really on our side and nobody really help us.

21 From one side, we are fighting there to block a Soviet
22 in this part; to defeat could be defeat other country, that
23 could be capture another area, because if we help with the
24 Soviet attack in Pakistan, can stay in Peshawar, and we help
25 these people, I don't think these people today in Afghan.

1 But we did not help because people want Afghanistan. If we
2 not help us today, it will become tomorrow today our home.
3 There is nothing special with us to say our enemy to be in
4 Afghanistan. The other people, if others are interested in
5 the Soviet. Mostly, we hear of many people to just say, we
6 are on the side of Mujahaddin, we are on the side of
7 Afghanistan, the Soviet are doing bad things to Afghanistan.
8 We doesn't need words, just words, because word is not useful
9 for us.

10 Because we need react. We need really from the people
11 to push the Soviet because Soviet fight us; Soviet know this
12 is the people who nobody will care about; nobody really upset
13 about it, going inside them and kill them. Otherwise, why
14 the soviets not attack other areas but to attack us?

15 I don't want to upset people because I am not a
16 diplomat. I am not a political man. I'm a soldier. I want
17 to say what I am feeling .

18 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Speak plainly.

19 MR. WHEELER: Say it right out loud.

20 COMMANDER ABDUL HAQ: Because anybody, the Mujahaddin,
21 the commander in Afghanistan, they decide that they were
22 going to fight with the Soviet; they were going to resist
23 against Soviet Union because we have no choice. If some
24 people, they help us or not, if the people is our side or
25 not, we were not going to blame an outside people to say, why

1 did you not help us. This is their job. If they love
2 freedom, they should help us. If they don't, we don't care.

3 We will not depend on our part to the help of outside.
4 We will be not waiting for the help of outside to war. We
5 will resist there until the last minute, until the last
6 person, until the last Mujahaddin in Afghanistan.

7 Anyway, from one side people say, we are sad for
8 Mujahaddin and the Soviet, why the Soviet is in Afghanistan?
9 But they have a relation with Soviet. Do you make business
10 with Soviet Union? They sell technology to the Soviet Union.
11 They buy gas from the Soviet Union. It is just no relation.
12 From one side, they decide in the United Nations, 190
13 countries decide the Soviet should go out in Afghanistan.
14 They the Soviet get on this thing and send 20, 30,000 more
15 soldiers to Afghanistan. This thing decided in the United
16 Nations does not even help but cause some more problem
17 inside.

18 What we think, what my Mujahaddin is thinking inside,
19 what our people is thinking in the beginning, we said all the
20 people in all the world is with us, because Soviets is doing
21 such terrible things in Afghanistan, and all the world is
22 really to our side, but since five or six years, what we have
23 been from the people is nothing. I was just to the end of my
24 work. If somebody, if the people wants to help us, they
25 should be really help. I was in France and mostly, people

1 help about the human helps and send us foods and this. If
2 there is no people in Afghanistan, if there is no human in
3 Afghanistan, they will send this human help to who? To
4 mountain, to rock, to stone, to stream? To what? What we
5 want from the people is not only to help us by human help and
6 militarily; the most important thing for us is to help us
7 politically, to push the Soviets from the diplomatic side,
8 from the United Nation, from the other business. The help of
9 this world is with us. To do not help the Soviet Union. You
10 do not make a business with the Soviet Union so they will
11 really feel hurt. Other people is against us because they
12 are in Afghanistan. If that is like that now, why the
13 Soviets should care? Why they should have right? Why does
14 it matter to them?

15 The feeling of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan is until
16 now, which is every day, every day, sending more soldier,
17 sending more people or more tanks or more aircraft just to
18 destroy us, and the react from outside is everybody become
19 lower and lower and lower.

20 I think sometime we are guilty on this, because we were
21 friends with the Soviets for a long time, I don't know, for
22 100 years or 50 or 60 years. The people that would resist
23 near to the Soviet Union who are the enemy of the
24 Soviet Union who are against Soviet Union, other country will
25 decide who had a good relation in the Soviet Union and a

1 friendly relation with. This is it, what I am thinking.

2 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Thank you, Commander.

3 Will you proceed with the video?

4 PRESENTATION OF VIDEOTAPE ON AFGHANISTAN

5 It has not been five years since the Soviet Army invaded
6 Afghanistan. Although these years have been marked by a
7 valiant and determined opposition to the invasion by the
8 people of Afghanistan, we cannot be blind to the misery and
9 suffering which has been imposed upon them. The last year,
10 particularly, has seen brutal and inhumane situations forced
11 on the general population. Genocide of the likes not seen
12 for many decades is occurring in this country.

13 A year ago, the people in village after village welcomed
14 the freedom fighters, the Mujahaddin, with open arms. The
15 population provided the Mujahaddin with food, shelter and
16 shared vital information on Soviet and Afghan communist
17 military activities. The people themselves were a vital part
18 of the Mujahaddin. It was obvious, the Mujahaddin were not
19 separate from the general population, but rather, nearly
20 everyone in Afghanistan were contributing to the efforts to
21 fight the foreign invaders. While up to a year ago there
22 were signs of Soviet military attacks, villages which had
23 been partially destroyed and some fields had been napalmed
24 and burned, and while there were many casualties from the
25 war, people continued to work their fields or herb their

1 animals. Today, the situation is much different. Our recent
2 trip across the mountains right up to the city of Kabul took
3 us to dozens of villages, but the people did not welcome the
4 Mujahaddin; they did not provide food; there were no beds to
5 sleep upon; there were no people. The villages had become
6 bombed out ruins, ghost towns.

7 The farms are dead, with irrigation systems destroyed.
8 With few exceptions, the people had fled. Their means of
9 support had been destroyed, their livestock had been
10 murdered, and caravans carrying food and necessities to them
11 has been cut down brutally.

12 The food situation inside the country is desperate. The
13 Soviet Army has created a famine situation by destroying the
14 infrastructure of the country. Harsh weather conditions add
15 to the misery.

16 The mountain trails are traveled by a constant stream of
17 refugees carrying everything they own on their backs; many
18 children; older people, some without sufficient clothing, all
19 hungry. Television reports and stories of this enforced
20 migratory genocide are infrequent, not because of any
21 unwillingness of western news operations to cover them, but
22 because of the difficulty and danger of obtaining them.
23 These two stories which we produced just over one month ago
24 give an example of what is happening in Afghanistan today.

25 VIDEOTAPE OF ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT

1 The Reagan Administration today has also condemned the
2 continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It is five
3 years since the Soviet invasion. President Reagan today
4 called the Soviet presence a serious impediment to the
5 improvement of relations between the superpowers. There is
6 no sign the Soviets have any thought of withdrawing. Only
7 recently has the Soviet media referred to what is going on as
8 a war. And there is no sign the anti-Soviet Afghan guerillas
9 intend to give up, even though they are badly outnumbered.
10 ABC's Don Straut has just spent three weeks on special
11 assignment inside Afghanistan, tonight his first report on
12 what he found.

13 It may not look like any way to win a war, but right
14 now, for Afghanistan guerillas, getting pictures taken is
15 part of the strategy. That way, if they are killed, they can
16 live forever, in the memories of other Mujahaddin. Today,
17 after five years of hammering by Soviet forces, memories are
18 one of the few things the guerillas have going. They are
19 still bogged down in a war of attrition, with weapons that
20 are often too old or don't work, British Enfield rifles from
21 World War I; rockets and missile launchers that break down.

22 Most arms and ammunition come from China, West Germany
23 and the United States, but guerillas from their camps in
24 Pakistan say they still need weapons to knock down Soviet
25 airplanes and helicopters, and are disappointed their allies

1 haven't given them more.

2 VIDEOTAPE OF COMMANDER ABDUL HAQ:

3 COMMANDER ABDUL HAQ: They don't care about it and they
4 don't do too much and I.

5 Q Why do you say that?

6 COMMANDER ABDUL HAQ: Why I should not say that?

7 Because during the five-year war with the Soviet, we have did
8 find nothing.

9 VIDEOTAPE OF ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT

10 Today, the war is pretty much what it has always been, a
11 stalemate, with even a series of attacks in the country.
12 This week, the pattern repeated as the Mujajaddin off for
13 another attack, starting point, the frontier town of
14 Terapmongul, (sic) a Dodge City out of the old west with no
15 Wyatt Erps, but where guns, granades you name it, can be had
16 with no questions asked. The only requirement is money.

17 Because the Pakistan government is sympathetic to the
18 resistance movement, crossing the border into Afghanistan is
19 usually no problem. The biggest obstacle is terrain, which
20 is better suited for mountain goats than humans or horses.
21 It was a three-day journey from Terapmongul (sic), a 140-mile
22 walk across mountains and vallies to Stalafargag (sic), a
23 jagged ten-day pass through from seven miles to the mountain
24 city of Kabul. From there, one gets a a clear path to the
25 highway, the main Soviet supply line in Afghanistan. It is

1 this route and the convoys which travel it which the
2 guerillas plan to attack. 100 yards from the site, weapons
3 are distributed, but there is a slight delay as one guerillas
4 struggles else with his knife to open a can of firing pins
5 for the mortars.

6 The battle plan is to hit the lead vehicle with a rocket
7 propelled grenade; then drop mortar loads behind the convoy,
8 blocking any effective means of escape. But instead of a
9 convoy, Soviet tanks show up. Although rockets failed to
10 stop the tank, the ambush starts heavy return fire from
11 Soviet soldiers and forces guards at this outpost to close
12 the road, exactly what the Mujahaddin wanted.

13 In recent months, such attacks have brought swift
14 reprisals from the Soviets. Villages have been bombed.
15 Innocent civilians have had their homes burned.

16 VIDEOTAPE OF VILLAGER

17 "These were clothes and bags. Everything is burned. We
18 hid ourselves while they burned and killed everything."

19 VIDEOTAPE OF ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT

20 The Mujahaddin vow their struggle against the Soviets
21 will continue anyway.

22 VIDEOTAPE OF COMMANDER ABDUL HAQ

23 "We wants to have freedoms, because they do not have
24 right to invade my country. Why? We don't want it, like it;
25 we don't want to work with them. We don't want to use them.

1 They just kill everybody."

2 VIDEOTAPE OF ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT

3 In every village, flags mark the graves where battles
4 are lost. Thousands have already lost in the five-year
5 struggle. Tomorrow and in the days that follow, there will
6 be many more flags to raise.

7 SECOND VIDEOTAPE OF ABC WORLD NEWS TONIGHT, December 27

8 For the second day in a row, President Reagan has had
9 something to say on the Soviet raid of Afghanistan. Mr.
10 Reagan called the day of the invasion a day of infamy, like
11 the bombing of Pearl Harbor. In Washington, several hundred
12 people marched on the Soviet Embassy to show their support
13 for the anti-Soviet guerillas' fighting in Afghanistan. The
14 war in Afghanistan has become increasingly brutal. It has
15 given almost three million Afghans to to seek refuge in next
16 door Pakistan. That is the largest concentration of refugees
17 anywhere. ABC's Dons Straught has been on special assignment
18 in Afghanistan, and this is the second in his series of
19 reports.

20 VIDEOTAPE OF REPORT FROM AFGHANISTAN

21 There are no signs posts to Sinsiri (sic) but these
22 days, none are are needed. Vultures point the way to a
23 village that has become a ghost town and a graveyard for
24 hundreds of animals. It happened earlier this month when
25 Soviet commandos attacked the village. Evren house was

1 burned. Every animal was shot. Kartog Adalvi, who lived
2 here, witnessed how Sinsiri
3 was destroyed: "We were fighting government soldiers.
4 We took the women to hide somewhere, but then the Russians
5 came. They killed everything, the sheep, the goats and the
6 cows. They didn't leave anything alive. People were dead,
7 too. I don't know how many." Those who did survive have
8 become part of an endless stream of refugees, packing what
9 articles they can carry and fleeing across mountains and
10 valleys to Pakistan. The exodus include the young and old;
11 many are sick; some have no shoes. But they leave anyway;
12 nearly a third of the country's 15 million population already
13 has gone. Gone, too, are entire villages where Afghanistan's
14 freedom fighters could once find food and shelter,
15 communities the guerillas relied on for information about
16 enemy movements, now empty ruins. This is the symbol of
17 Soviet strategy, destroy what might be useful to the
18 Mujahaddin: farms, irrigation systems, even camel caravans
19 carrying food and medicine.

20 "The soldiers, huh? Where from they came, huh? Why?"

21 The answer for refugees is no longer important; just
22 escaping with a few cherished possessions is what matters
23 now. Most of the refugees who make it across the border end
24 up in camps like this one, living under the protection of the
25 Pakistan government, away from the bombs which have destroyed

1 their homes. Life in the camps is far from easy. Medical
2 facilities are few. Cross border strikes by Soviet aircraft
3 are common. Although each person receives a monthly
4 allotment of food, most supplies, such as cooking oil and
5 kerosene have to be carefully rationed.

6 Since most refugees cannot read or write, they sign for
7 their goods with a thumb print. Thus far, about 300 camps
8 have been set up to handle the refugees, to keep alive the
9 hope that Afghanistan will some day be free again.

10 VIDEOTAPE OF COMMANDER ABDUL HAQ

11 "Everybody is afraid to die, you know. Everyone is
12 afraid about himself. He wants to be alive. But in our
13 society, if you do not have a country, if you do not have a
14 freedom, you are like dead, you know. Your life doesn't mean
15 anything.

16 So the Mujahadeen continue their struggle, knowing well
17 that as more refugees leave the country, the chance of
18 victory may disappear, as well. Don Straut, ABC News,
19 Afghanistan.

20 The people of Afghanistan are struggling to survive.
21 They need help. They hear our words of support and hope they
22 are not just words. VIDEOTAPE OF PRESIDENT REAGAN

23 "And we must not break faith with those who are risking
24 their lives on every continent, from Afghanistan to
25 Nicaragua, to defy Soviet-supported aggression and secure

1 rights which have been ours from birth."

2 (Applause.)

3 VIDEOTAPE MESSAGE BY MR. LOHBECK

4 Their homes are being destroyed; their food supplies are
5 being bombed; their people are dying. Like people
6 everywhere, they want to live in freedom and peace.

7 COMMANDER ABDUL HAQ

8 "Back in our society, if you do not have a country, if
9 you do not have a freedom, you are, like, dead. Your life
10 doesn't mean anything."

11 MR. LOHBECK: Thank you, Senator.

12 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: My House colleagues have had to
13 leave because of a vote under way. They will be returning.
14 Mr. Rubin, is there any question in your mind? Do you speak
15 today for Helsinki Watch?

16 MR. RUBIN: Yes, I do.

17 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: You are officially speaking for
18 them. Is there any doubt in the mind of that organization
19 that there is a deliberate policy on the part of the Soviets
20 to destroy agriculture and a means of providing food for the
21 insurgents and the civilish population?

22 MR. RUBIN: There can be no other explanation for the
23 phenomenon we have observed.

24 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: So you say that it is a deliberate
25 strategy; it is a deliberate effort; it is not not collateral

1 war damage?

2 MR. RUBIN: Yes. Let me elaborate on that. I suppose
3 there are some other possible explanations for isolated
4 reports.

5 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Yes.

6 MR. RUBIN: That is, it might be that in some cases,
7 individual units overreact to an attack and go off and kill
8 some people. In fact, that does happen from time to time.

9 It might be that the Soviet military is trying to hit
10 the Mujahaddin and in the course of doing so, they
11 unintentionally or carelessly damage the agricultural system.

12 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Yes.

13 MR. RUBIN: However, most of the reports that we receive
14 indicate that in many cases, they make very little effort,
15 actually, to hit the Mujahaddin, because it is too difficult
16 for them to do so. Instead, they are pursuing this strategy
17 of destroying agriculture and of killing civilian population
18 that we have all described.

19 If we want some more evidence of that, there are a
20 couple of things that we could point to. First of all, there
21 are many cases where this reprisal takes a reprisal against
22 the civilian population. For an attack does not take place
23 immediately after the attack. It may take place the next day.
24 I can cite examples after the attack unit has gone back to
25 the base and received further orders. In many cases, the

1 reprisal is the work of the air forces, so obviously, what
2 has occurred is that if there is a reprisal that the ground
3 forces have communicated back to headquarters that there has
4 been an attack. Then the air forces are notified to go out
5 and attack the civilian population.

6 Now, beyond that, there are, of course, all these cases
7 are not reprisals for specific attacks. There are certain
8 regions of the country which have become consistent bases for
9 the resistance fighters, such as Panjsher Valley; such as the
10 Province of Logar; such as the entire area surrounding the
11 City of Kabul and surrounding the City of Jalalabad, along
12 that road there, around the city of Hungar, where it is clear
13 the Soviets have organized prolonged offensives in which one
14 component of the offensive is the systematic destruction of
15 the agricultural facilities and the food.

16 Another indication of that is that according to
17 Professor Louis Dupree, who is, of course, one of the leading
18 American experts on Afghanistan with whom I spoke after his
19 return from Pakistan last fall. There are specific weapons
20 to which I briefly alluded in my testimony, that the Soviets
21 have developed specifically for the destruction of wheat in
22 an agricultural system like Afghanistan.

23 Let me just briefly describe them, according to him. I
24 cannot testify to this myself, but these are fragmentation
25 weapons. That is, they are bombs that explode, and when they

1 explode, what they do is project large numbers of small
2 phosphorous pellets that ignite when they hit the ground or
3 when they hit the wheat.

4 There are two types of devices which have different
5 forms of ignition. One of them is dropped by helicopter and
6 explodes in mid- air, scattering the phosphorous pellets over
7 a large surface. This is used for burning the standing crop
8 in the fields.

9 Another type explodes on contact with the ground, sending
10 out the phosphorous pellets in a certain radius around the
11 point of impact. This is widely used around harvest time and
12 threshing time when the wheat is gathered in open areas.
13 This pattern of burning wheat when it is scattered on the
14 threshing floor with special weapons was confirmed to us
15 among others from peasants from the Sokalur (sic) region of
16 Kapishul (sic) Province, who describe how farmers in their
17 region have, in fact, taken to digging trenches around their
18 threshing floors and filling them with water so that they can
19 put out the fires. Others describe threshing taking place in
20 caves.

21 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: All right. I will have to ask you
22 to keep your answers shorter so we can cover as much ground
23 as possible today. There are many interesting aspects of the
24 tragedy unfolding in Afghanistan. Today, we are going to try
25 to keep our focus on hunger. We will focus on other elements

1 in future weeks.

2 So the answer to the question is there is no doubt in
3 the mind of the organization Helsinki Watch that the Soviets
4 are employing a deliberate policy of destroying agriculture
5 as a means of bringing the people of that country into a
6 condition of starvation?

7 MR. RUBIN: Either the purpose of it is to present them
8 with a choice of starvation or fleeing.

9 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: All right. Then I will modify my
10 question. There is no doubt the Soviets are pursuing a
11 deliberate policy of destroying the means of producing food
12 in order to either drive the people out or to starve them to
13 death?

14 MR. RUBIN: Yes.

15 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: There is no doubt in the mind of
16 Helsinki Watch?

17 MR. RUBIN: There is no doubt in the mind of Helsinki.

18 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: One gets the impression in talking
19 to government officials, sometimes, that they believe that a
20 substantial proportion of the destruction of the agriculture
21 of that country is simply collateral war damage. You would
22 not agree with that?

23 MR. RUBIN: No, because most of it, in fact, is the
24 result of attacks that are targeted on specific civilian
25 targets, not on military targets that happen to be in the

1 vicinity of civilian targets.

2 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: For instance, the poisoning of a
3 well would hardly be collateral war damage.

4 MR. RUBIN: No, or the poisoning of wheat flour, which
5 has also been reported to us.

6 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: In homes or in other stocks?

7 MR. RUBIN: Yes.

8 MR. LOHBECK: Senator, if I could add an addendum to
9 that answer, I am sure that the cows and the camels and the
10 dogs that were in the village that you just saw that were
11 shot with small arms weapon by commando troops moving through
12 the open countryside, that was not collateral war damage.
13 They were deliberate targets.

14 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Mr. Rubin, are you aware of any
15 effort on the part of any western government or on the part
16 of any government anywhere to bring this violation of the
17 Geneva Accords to the attention of an appropriate body to
18 seek sanctions of any kind against the Soviet Union for this
19 violation?

20 MR. RUBIN: Well, of course, the U. S. representative at
21 the United Nations, Jeane Kirkpatrick, has raised this issue
22 in a variety of speeches, and currently, the United Nations
23 Human Rights Commission is meeting in Geneva. One of the
24 items on the agenda there is to hear the report of the
25 Professor Felix Ircora, which I have not seen, but which may

1 very well deal with these issues.

2 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: I understand the frustration of
3 Commander Haq in all of these hearings and talk. It is
4 frustrating to all of us, but at the same time, one of the
5 important elements, it seems to me, in this struggle, is to
6 force the Soviets out of Afghanistan is to bring to bear, to
7 the maximum possible extent, public pressure. The only way
8 to do that is to continue to bring out these atrocities. It
9 is an, unfortunately, frustrating and slow process, but what
10 we are doing today is an essential element, I believe.

11 Mr. Lobeck, you said something to the effect that we
12 should not delude ourselves that the freedom fighters are
13 winning. As you know, the State Department released a
14 statement which I considered rather self-serving back in
15 December, which pointed out that the freedom fighters are
16 still in control of something like 80 or 90 percent of the
17 country, and the essence of which statement was that if
18 things are going pretty well, then we should not be overly
19 concerned. Perhaps that is not the way the State Department
20 would characterize it, but I got the impression that it was
21 self-serving and congratulatory. That conflicts with what
22 you said.

23 Do you want to amplify what you said on that point?

24 MR. LOHBECK: I agree with the statement that the
25 Mujahaddin are in control of 80 percent of the mountains or

1 the desert.

2 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Does that matter?

3 MR. LOHBECK: It doesn't matter at all.

4 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Why?

5 MR. LOHBECK: I will base my answer to your question on
6 what I have read on previous Afghan history; what I know of
7 other countries of that size and population; but primarily,
8 what Abdul Haq told me about a year ago and has told me
9 several times since. Control of Afghanistan amounts to
10 control of the City of Kabul, Kandahar and Kerat. When you
11 control those three cities, you control the country.

12 We can look at similar situations in Nicaragua, that
13 when the Sandinistas marched into Managua they had the
14 country; when Fidel Castro marched into Havana, they had the
15 country. The city of Kabul is in the tight grip of the
16 Soviet Army and the Soviet advisors that run the country with
17 the Karmal puppets in front of them. They are not being
18 defeated in the City of Kabul; they control it. That is the
19 government. That is where the government is. That is where
20 the government administration is. That is where there are
21 now nearly two million internal refugees from the country in
22 addition to those that have been forced out to Pakistan and
23 Iran.

24 It is my belief from seeing the situation in the country
25 today that the Soviets feel that they can control adequately

1 a country of four or five million people centered in Kabul,
2 Kandahar and Herat. They cannot control a country of fifteen
3 million people, which was the population prior to the
4 invasion. So when they send what will be up to four million
5 people within the next year in refugee status in Pakistan, up
6 to two and a half million people by the end of this year in
7 Iran, killed another million and a half people, they have
8 reduced the population to four or five million people, which
9 they will be able to control.

10 The priority of aid should be given to that area of the
11 resistance, both humanitarian aid and military aid, which
12 effectively operates in Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. Having
13 control of a mountainside 15,000 feet up in the air, it gives
14 you territory and acreage, but it doesn't inflict any damage
15 on the Soviets.

16 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Or control the villages, which are
17 nothing but rubble. I assume you filmed all of that.

18 MR. LOHBECK: Yes, sir

19 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY That is excellent footage. You
20 showed in the film several villages that had been utterly
21 destroyed.

22 MR. LOHBECK: Yes, sir.

23 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Commander Haq, what percentage of
24 the villages outside of the major cities, what percentage of
25 the villages in the parts of the country controlled by the

1 freedom fighters have been utterly destroyed as those we saw
2 on the film?

3 COMMANDER ABDUL HAQ: This will be hard to say exactly,
4 10 or 15 or 20 percent, but there are a few places or a few
5 still which they are controlled by the Soviets. like Mr.
6 Kurt told us before Kabul and Kandahar. Still, example,
7 Kabul is one of the cities where they had most of their
8 soldiers there, but still, in that condition, which is they
9 had two or three Soviets divisions, two, three, four, five,
10 six brigade, some of the division, and we still could move
11 into attacks there, which for the people which is the most
12 important. You had that amount of soldier, and you still
13 could attack.

14 That means they do not have 100 percent of control even
15 in a place like Kabul.

16 This would be hard to say, 10 percent or 9 percent
17 because mostly in Europe you could see the cities are very
18 big and all mostly like you see when you are in Washington or
19 France, most of the people live in cities. Most in
20 Afghanistan, most of the people live in countryside and
21 outside like he described. It is not only the house, the
22 community, just only, because they decide the life of the
23 people which is because people exist on food and are near the
24 food.

25 For example, their economy, there are animals, humans.

1 It is not that we are all the way. But is to describe the
2 life of the people, which is something like 90 percent or
3 something like that.

4 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Can you tell us, I will ask each of
5 the witnesses to tell us what the Afghan diet was. Describe
6 the Afghan diet five years ago and what it is today, and
7 especially for children. Can you do that?

8 COMMANDER ABDUL HAQ: I do not understand.

9 (Discussion off the record.)

10 COMMANDER ABDUL HAQ: The food or things like that or
11 especially general things, for people of Afghanistan is a
12 poor people and do not have a nice life like in Europe. But
13 still anyway, now what they did for our people, which is
14 especially for the children, is nothing left. Only in few
15 place, in few area, which is we would like Kabul. If we
16 doesn't come it is just--otherwise, there is nothing left for
17 the children. Because mostly for the children, the life of
18 the children, for the children, they drop one kind of things
19 which--I don't know what they call it, the drop of one things
20 like looks like a watch and children go and collect it and it
21 hangs in. This is for the children and nothing else.

22 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Is anyone able to describe a typical
23 meal six or eight years ago and what it is like today so that
24 we can see the effect for the individual, especially for
25 children on this Soviet policy of destroying production of

1 food?

2 MR. LOHBECK: I think the first response to your
3 question is delicious. It is primarily a rice diet, meat,
4 mutton and beef cooked with the experience of 2000 years of
5 history; it is very good. There is unleavened bread called
6 nun, is one of the most delicious I have ever, had was in
7 plentiful supply. Rice was in plentiful supply. There were
8 enough sheep and cows around the country that the diet was
9 very good.

10 As for children, Afghanistan has historically had one of
11 the highest infant mortality rates in the world. I have seen
12 some figures that say upwards to 50 percent. This was a
13 pretty grave situation. Since, it has become much worse.
14 The Soviets, however, have addressed that problem with a very
15 ingenuitive program. They are stealing children. They have
16 stolen 10,000 children-- I think kidnaped is the word--and
17 taken them to the Soviet Union for retraining in socialist
18 education so that they will be able to return to Afghanistan
19 better educated in a Marxist philosophy. In fact, and I
20 think Commander Hag can address this question as to how they
21 are coming back, they are not coming back well educated.
22 They are not coming back well fed. They are coming back as
23 death machines, 12- and 13-year-old children who come into
24 Mujahaddin encampments as assassination squads. That was the
25 result of their education after being kidnaped by the

1 Soviet Union.

2 So perhaps the infant mortality rate has gone down a
3 little bit, but that's because the infants have gone down.

4 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: We understand that point. What I am
5 trying to do is to bring out--

6 MR. LOHBECK: To bring out the difference,.

7 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: What are children eating? Describe
8 it, quantity and quality. Does anyone know?

9 MR. LOHBECK: Going across three provinces in November
10 and December of 1984, the only food that we had was turnips
11 and wild onions, and we saw in the villages an occasional
12 chicken or two. I am talking about about two dozen villages
13 that we went through. That was the extent of the food.
14 There was occasional rice, but primarily, it was turnips or
15 that type of root vegetable which survived under the ground
16 after the Soviet bombing. The food, it was scarce.

17 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Prior to the Soviet invasion, were
18 dairy products, especially milk for children, a substantial
19 part of the diet?

20 MR. RUBIN: I believe the major dairy products were very
21 widely consumed, especially in the form of yogurt, rather
22 than by milk by itself.

23 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Is that generally available to
24 children today outside the cities?

25 MR. RUBIN: The situation varies a great deal in

1 different regions. The regions that my colleagues have been
2 describing here between Pakistan and Kabul, where the
3 heaviest fighting has taken place, as he said, there is
4 virtually no food available there; and rather than face that
5 situation, the people have fled.

6 There are other areas which are not as strategic for the
7 Soviets, which are far away from the highway, where they have
8 not, as of yet at any rate, found it necessary to undertake
9 these campaigns, and the diet has not changed very
10 substantially. So the hunger problem is concentrated in the
11 areas that he has indicated on this map.

12 But in those areas, obviously, if you systematically
13 kill the livestock, you also destroy the source of dairy,
14 which was a major source of protein, for children and adults.

15 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Thank you.

16 Congressman Petri?

17 MR. PETRI: Thank you. I apologise for missing part of
18 the questioning due to a vote in the House. I think several
19 of my colleagues will be coming back from it shortly. I had
20 just one or two--a lot of questions--but one or two I thought
21 I would ask.

22 First, Professor Rubin, you referred to something about
23 the Geneva Convention in your testimony. I couldn't find it
24 in this testimony. Maybe I just missed the page. If you
25 could refer to it again and tell us, what is the enforcement

1 mechanism? The Soviet Union is a signatory to the Geneva
2 Convention; is it not?

3 MR. RUBIN: Yes, it is. It is not in my prepared
4 testimony for today. The specific article I cited is on page
5 169 of the Helsinki Watch Report, which I believe all Members
6 of Congress have received. If not, I have a few other copies
7 with me.

8 That is not the Geneva Conventions themselves but the
9 additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, the Geneva
10 Convention of 1947, the additional Protocols of 1977. I
11 regret to say that international law is not my field, and I
12 am not aware of exactly what the enforcement mechanisms are.
13 If I am not mistaken, and perhaps someone here may be able to
14 correct me, it is within the mandate of the Security Council
15 of the United Nations to examine violations of the Geneva
16 Conventions and recommend appropriate sanctions.

17 But I am open to correction on that. Certainly, it is
18 within the mandate of the United Nations Human Rights
19 Commission, which, however, does not have the enforcement
20 authority of the Security Council.

21 MR. PETRI: And--

22 MR. RUBIN: If I may add something to that?

23 MR. PETRI: Sure.

24 MR. RUBIN: In fact, however, these mechanisms do not
25 work automatically. They are just words on paper. They only

1 work if international public opinion, governments, voluntary
2 organizations, the press and others mobilize their energies
3 to pressure those who are violating these international
4 agreements.

5 As Commander Abdul Haq said, the most important support
6 we could give to these people or the victims of these
7 violations is mobilizing these political forces, which
8 unfortunately has not been done.

9 MR. PETRI: But my impression of the Convention and the
10 Protocols is that it is a basic sort of a foundation of
11 international behavior and that what is going on in
12 Afghanistan is a detailed, meticulous, comprehensive
13 violation of provisions of the Protocol of the Geneva
14 Convention; is that correct?

15 MR. RUBIN: That is correct. You have can just go down
16 article by article.

17 MR. PETRI: Mr. Lohbeck, I am interested. You talked
18 about, I think it was the Soviet Ambassador to--was it
19 Pakistan?

20 MR. LOHBECK: Yes, sir.

21 MR. PETRI: Who announced that if another journalist
22 happened to be found by the authorities in Afghanistan that
23 they would not return him but, instead, would shoot him, and
24 that was understood.

25 MR. LOHBECK: His exact quote was that the next western

1 journalist that was captured by the Afghan government, by the
2 Khad, which is the Afghan secret police, they would be
3 executed and he said, "And my government will assist that
4 operation."

5 MR. PETRI: Was he speaking at some cocktail party or
6 something? Was he speaking as the Ambassador? Is this the
7 policy of the Soviet Union, is to shoot journalists, or was
8 he speaking on behalf of the Afghanistani government and said
9 it would shoot?

10 MR. LOHBECK: He was speaking as the Ambassador of the
11 Soviet Union in Pakistan in a public statement to the press.
12 It was a recorded statement, and to my knowledge, has never
13 been denied by the Soviet government.

14 MR. PETRI: Did he say this would be done after trials
15 and all that by the Afghan stories? I find it extraordinary
16 that an Ambassador of one country would say that they would
17 shoot journalists of another country in a third country.

18 We hear a lot about international terrorism and one
19 thing and another, but this isn't by groups operating on a
20 non-official basis. If this is true, this would be an
21 extraordinary policy--

22 MR. LOHBECK: I agree with you.

23 MR. PETRI: Of a major world power. I am curious if you
24 can pinpoint it.

25 MR. LOHBECK: Do you have it?

1 MR. RUBIN: I have the quote. If I may, this is on page
2 186 of the Helsinki Watch Report in the section on
3 restricting and attacking journalists.

4 I am reading you the text of a French press dispatch
5 that was published on October 7th, 1984. This is a quote
6 from Vitaly Smirnov Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan speaking
7 to Oliva Feron of French television and a France press
8 conference in Islamabad.

9 "I warn you and through you, all of your journalist
10 colleagues. Stop trying to penetrate Afghanistan with the
11 so-called Mujahaddin. From now on, the bandits and the
12 so-called journalists, French, American, British and others
13 accompanying them will be killed and our units in Afghanistan
14 will help the Afghan forces to do it."

15 Now, this was published around the world, and the
16 Soviet Union has not issued any denial of it.

17 MR. PETRI: Do you know if--

18 MR. LOHBECK: I think the statement itself also answers
19 your question as to whether this was after trial, and he said
20 it was going to be their military units that was going to do
21 it. As a result of that statement and in addition to just
22 common sense before that, precautions taken in have
23 increased, but at the same time, I am not fooling myself.
24 I'm sure Jack Wheeler this afternoon will tell you the same
25 thing. We have no pretenses that if we get caught, sianara.

1 MR. PETRI: I don't want to belabor it, but I am curious
2 to know whether any other governments or international
3 journalist organizations have taken this up or have expressed
4 any opinion on this or whether there are organizations like
5 Helsinki or intellectuals in the journalist community that
6 feel this is an unusual policy for a government and make it a
7 matter kind of of professional operation on their part or is
8 it understood that some countries can say this about
9 journalists and other countries can't to do that?

10 MR. LOHBECK: I understand what you are saying. I
11 understand the point of what you are saying. I don't put
12 myself in a special class of person immune to what is
13 happening in Afghanistan. I would not want to respond to
14 that question by thinking that because I go in to cover a
15 news story that something that happens to me would be worse
16 because I was a journalist than what is already happening to
17 the children and the people of Afghanistan as it is.

18 I merely think that as an electronic historian that what
19 is happening should be recorded for the world. The issue of
20 Afghanistan is not what could happen to me as a journalist.
21 That is irrelevant. That is not the story. The story to be
22 reported is what is happening in Afghanistan, and there are
23 those of us, and I think any member of the free world's
24 press, that feels that the events that take place in the
25 world should be recorded as they are. That happens to be one

1 event and one statement, and it should be recorded and taken
2 for what it is.

3 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: I would like to try to establish one
4 or two more points before we go onto the next panel. I think
5 all of this panel are unanimous in finding that the Soviets
6 are deliberately destroying the means of producing food as a
7 tactic to drive out or starve out not only the freedom
8 fighters but the civilian population, including the children
9 and the elderly.

10 I would like to try to establish how effective that
11 policy has been and what its implications are. Mr. Rubin, do
12 you want to start off? Is it just spotty? Is it a calamity?
13 Is it a famine? Is famine impending? Let's explore that
14 area.

15 MR. RUBIN: Briefly, the situation is not identical in
16 all regions of Afghanistan. In my remarks, I will be
17 discussing the areas in which this policy has been carried
18 out, which are the ones identified by this very helpful map.
19 In those areas, the policy has been extremely effective. It
20 has been much more effective than the Soviet military
21 attempts to catch or infiltrate the resistance fighters.

22 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Let me interrupt you there. I think
23 that is an important statement. You are saying that the
24 Soviet efforts to starve out the people of Afghanistan has
25 been, did you say, far more effective than their military

1 operations?

2 MR. RUBIN: Yes. Well, those are their military
3 operations.

4 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Those are the--

5 MR. RUBIN: Not in the conventional sense. They have
6 been effective in driving one-third to one-quarter of the
7 population of Afghanistan to seek refuge in the neighboring
8 countries of Pakistan and Iran and in killing a number that
9 probably will never be adequately accounted for.

10 It has been successful as a result of that in forcing
11 the resistance fighters either to cease their attacks or to
12 retreat in a number of regions, because the civilian
13 population has put pressure on them, saying they can no
14 longer stand these attacks. That has been reported from some
15 regions. In other regions, the civilian population has stood
16 firm and been forced to leave. There was a further part of
17 your question.

18 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: In your view, based on what you have
19 been able to determine, is famine present? Is it impending?

20 MR. RUBIN: Again, and here I am basing myself on the
21 report issued by the British organization Afghanistan, and I
22 believe a representative of that organization will testify
23 later.

24 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Yes.

25 MR. RUBIN: Since he will, I will make only a brief

1 statement. Famine may be impending in certain regions of the
2 country, in particular, in areas like Badakhchan Province,
3 where there has been both heavy fighting to which the Soviets
4 have responded by destroying agriculture, and which are
5 relatively isolated and distant from the areas of country, of
6 refuge in the neighboring countries and which, furthermore,
7 are distant from the markets which are still operating in
8 some areas of the country.

9 So that people there cannot purchase food on the market;
10 they cannot flee to a neighboring country, and their
11 agricultural system there has been destroyed. So we could
12 see pockets of famine in remote regions of Afghanistan in the
13 near future.

14 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Meaning this summer?

15 MR. ROBIN: The data I have seen is only from 1983.
16 Famine is more likely to occur in the winter than in the
17 summer. I heard predictions that, in fact, in certain
18 regions, there might be a famine this winter. I think we
19 might start hearing about such things in the next few months
20 because people cannot come out of Badakhchan at this time of
21 the year. They will be starting to come out in March.

22 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Commander, how serious is this
23 problem of hunger? Is it your greatest difficulty today, or
24 is something greater than the problem of hunger induced by
25 the Soviets?

1 COMMANDER ABDUL HAQ: In some part of Afghanistan, this
2 is a big problem, because in all of Afghanistan, the
3 situation is not the same. You see, there is no problem of
4 Afghanistan in the problem of food. There is some part of
5 the country where there is a problem, a big problem. There
6 is some part of the country where it will be a problem in
7 next few years. Some people, in a village you grow a big
8 agriculture. But in this year, they destroyed the materials
9 which people make agriculture with, and they try if they
10 destroy in the future, there is going to be a big problem.

11 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Do you think that widespread famine
12 is likely to occur in Afghanistan if things continue the way
13 they are?

14 COMMANDER ABDUL HAQ: I think it should be, because the
15 people, the problem, it will be especially a big problem for
16 the civilian side, which is a big damage to them, but anyway
17 to the resistant side, this will still continue. We will see
18 the result.

19 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Just a moment, and we will go to our
20 next panel. I do want to ask you, Commander Haq, one
21 question that is not really related to the focus of this
22 hearing, hunger, but instead, while you are here, since this
23 is our only opportunity, ask you how you view as a freedom
24 fighter and a commander of freedom fighters the continued
25 recognition by the United States of the Kabul government.

1 I'm sorry if I confused you.

2 (Discussion off the record.)

3 COMMANDER ABDUL HAQ: I think you must know better than
4 I know, because the Kabul government is something
5 like--because there is no people with them; there is
6 no--because if they had a people, if they had enough
7 population, then they do need to bring the Soviet soldier to
8 defend, even he could not defend himself by his people. You
9 cannot trust these people to defend the Soviets around him.
10 If he do not have one person to protect Badakhshan, how can
11 he recognize his government?

12 MR. LOMBECK: I think you have might ask Commander Haq
13 how long the government would survive if the Soviets left.

14 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: I think we know that.

15 Commander Haq, do you find it difficult to believe that
16 the people of the United States stand with the freedom
17 fighters and encourage the freedom fighters on the one hand,
18 but on the other hand, our government continues to recognize
19 the Karmal government? Is that difficult for you to
20 understand?

21 COMMANDER ABDUL HAQ: Yes. It should be because one is
22 a policy of the government and another is people. People is
23 different and should not be the same. People think one way,
24 but they go another way.

25 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Thank you all very much.

1 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: We will ask our next panel to be
2 seated, if they will: Lord Cranborne, Rosanne Klass, and
3 Jack Wheeler.
4

5 STATEMENT OF LORD CRANBORNE, CHAIRMAN OF AFGHAN AID
6 WHICH PRODUCED THE REPORT: "THE THREAT OF FAMINE IN
7 AFGHANISTAN"

8 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: May we have order, please?

9 I will also ask Dr. Antoine Crouan of Medecins Sans
10 Frontieres to join us at the table. We welcome our witnesses
11 and thank them for their participation and help.

12 The panel is comprised of Lord Cranborne, Chairman of
13 the organization Afghanaid and a Member of Parliament; Rosanne
14 Klass, a representative of the Afghan Information Center,
15 Freedom House and Vice President of the Afghan Relief
16 Committee; Dr. Jack Wheeler, Director of the Freedom Research
17 Foundation; and Dr. Antoine Crouan of Medecins Sans
18 Frontieres.

19 Lord Cranborne, will you lead off, please?

20 LORD CRANBORNE: Thank you, Senator. If I may, I would
21 like to echo my predecessors on the previous panel in
22 thanking you for having the courtesy to ask me here as a
23 representative of Afghanaid, which is a charity which
24 operates in tandem with British Afghanistan Support
25 Committee.

1 I am chairman of both organizations, and I hope that
2 what I tell you will be a distillation of the views of the
3 members of both committees. I won't bore you, Senator, and
4 your colleagues, with the repetition of the evidence that we
5 have heard so far, but I would like to emphasize that I
6 wholly agree that a tragedy on a vast scale has hit
7 Afghanistan, that the refugees, particularly in Pakistan,
8 roughly three million of them, have been adequately looked
9 after, thanks to the efforts of the international community,
10 and also to the efforts of the Pakistan government. I think
11 it's also fair to say that the real need is inside
12 Afghanistan among those who are left behind.

13 This doesn't only mean the people who are still in
14 possession of their farms and houses, but also the many
15 hundreds of thousands of internal refugees who it is very
16 difficult to number, which from anecdotal evidence we know
17 exist, particularly around the capital of Kabul.

18 Now, I understand that the purpose of today's hearings
19 is principally to consider the question of food, and if I
20 may, I would like to concentrate my opening remarks on that
21 question and the way my committee sees that the outside world
22 can address itself to its solution.

23 First of all, I think it is perfectly clear that there
24 is a need. Some have intimated that this need is mainly due
25 to adverse weather conditions, insufficient snow, for

1 instance, which has been one of the main sources of water in
2 Afghanistan for time immorial.

3 This is not, in my view, the real reason. Inadequate
4 snow and inadequate water generally has been present in
5 Afghanistan before. However, it is clear that the main
6 source of trouble can be laid at the door of the Soviet
7 invasion forces and the brutal methods that they have used in
8 order to try and achieve their objective, which is plainly
9 the subjugation of Afghanistan.

10 I think it is important that anybody who approaches this
11 question should be under no illusions whatsoever about the
12 principal cause of this, and to that extent, I certainly do
13 endorse the main thrust of what you have heard so far.

14 Nevertheless, I think it is difficult to assess the need
15 in a scientific manner. It was said by a politician who had
16 a certain amount of fame in my own country, Lloyd George, of
17 one of his liberal party colleagues that he sat so long up
18 the fence that eventually the iron entered into his soul.

19 I see no possible chance of that happening in these
20 hearings, Senator, I am pleased to say. Nevertheless, I
21 would utter one word of warning, and that is, quite simply,
22 that it is very easy when confronted with the sort of
23 pictures we saw in that excellent video film earlier on to
24 assume that the horror that we feel must provoke an instant
25 response and that vast sums of money must be poured

1 willy-nilly into an enormous number of willing hands.

2 If I leave one message with the Committee today, I hope
3 it will be this: in my view, all aid is a highly complex and
4 difficult business, which is best left to professionals. So
5 far in Afghanistan, the evidence for what has happened has
6 been left to the anecdotal evidence of a few brave spirits.
7 Some of them, indeed, have been extremely professional,
8 whether they have been journalists or, indeed, the
9 magnificent teams of, particularly, French doctors, one of
10 whom is sitting at the end of the table this afternoon.

11 There is no doubt that their work has been very good and
12 that in almost all these cases, it has been effective,
13 although it has been hampered by lack of resources and also
14 the extremely difficult operating conditions within the
15 country. Nevertheless, there have been examples of aid which
16 has been indiscriminate and ill-judged. This not only, in my
17 view, destroys the reputation of western donors among the
18 Afghans themselves, but I think, too, it does a great deal
19 more harm than good in the outside world.

20 Therefore, it is important that any help from now on in
21 is help that is professionally run and above all, based on
22 professional research.

23 My organization, the organization of which I am
24 chairman, is a very small one, and therefore, it is difficult
25 to that extent to practice what we preach. Nevertheless, we

1 have endeavored to do so in one field which we think there is
2 an overwhelming need, and that is the field of food aid.

3 Now, we did produce a report, a copy of which I think is
4 in the possession of your committee, called "The Threat of
5 Famine in Afghanistan". I do have a copy here, which my
6 committee commissioned Dr. Frances D'Souza, a well-known
7 expert in the field, to produce and which was published in
8 May, 1984. Dr. D'Souza and I even traveled to New York in an
9 endeavor to launch this document and we brought it to the
10 attention of various United Nations agencies.

11 Now, you will see that there are some very disturbing
12 conclusions embodied in that report, and I would refer you,
13 in particular, to pages--I hope I remember this right--27 and
14 28 of the report, where it makes it clear that the pre-famine
15 indicators--I apologize for the jargon-- the pre-famine
16 indicators in parts of Afghanistan covered by the report are
17 at least as bad as some of the pre-famine indicators in parts
18 of Africa, like Biafra in the 1960s.

19 This is a cause for concern. It is all the more
20 important, I think, to realize that if we are going to
21 produce sensible support for people in need who do need food
22 that that aid should be based principally on signed research,
23 and I am very conscious that that report now needs updating
24 and, indeed, is only partial in its coverage of the country.
25 If anybody wants to give us money to do some more, it would

1 be very well.

2 I would, if I may, Senator, like to make a couple of
3 other points, and I am conscious that you only want me to
4 stick to ten minutes, but I am only in Washington for 24
5 hours, so I am going to grab my chance while I can. As I
6 say, this has been the basis of the approach by the British
7 charity of which I am chairman, and indeed, we have tried to
8 use Dr. D'Souza's report to construct a pilot project for the
9 feeding of one particular group of refugees, of people inside
10 Afghanistan who we hear are in particular need.

11 We have tried to follow in this up by the construction
12 of a program which I hope will not only provide the sort of
13 help which is urgently needed, but also will act as a model
14 for future efforts by people better endowed than ourselves.

15 One of the most important parts of this particular
16 element of our activities, I would suggest, is our
17 concentration on the importance of accountability for aid.
18 Not only is it important that the aid goes to where it is
19 most needed, but also it is important that donors are
20 satisfied that that is what is happening, because that alone
21 will persuade donors to give more.

22 We have also brought with us, and I think your committee
23 also has a copy, of a memorandum by Dr. D'Souza entitled
24 "Food Aid for Afghanistan". Now, this document tries to give
25 a detailed account of what food our project needs and what

1 proportion of the population of 100,000, which it is
2 addressing itself to, will receive help and how much help
3 what proportion of that population will receive.

4 So I do hope that anybody who wants to ask questions
5 about it will have a look at this, and I will try to answer
6 those questions. I should add that the estimated cost in
7 this particular part of Afghanistan of our pilot project is
8 not negligible, particularly to somebody who, like the
9 British, are feeling rather broke at the moment. We estimate
10 it will cost about 250,000 pounds sterling for one month of
11 food, of which a third is transport.

12 We have based our project on the theory that for
13 political and practical reasons, not the least of which is
14 expense, it is most sensible for our project to concentrate
15 on transferring food already inside Afghanistan from areas
16 where there is a surplus, and there are plenty of those
17 areas, even now, to areas of need.

18 If I may, I would like to make a couple of other points.
19 I have been accused as Chairman of this Committee of crying
20 wolf. I have been told that this report does not say that
21 there is a famine in Afghanistan. It doesn't, but I would
22 remind you that certainly in Europe, we were well aware of
23 the urgency of the threat of famine in Ethiopia for over two
24 years before the late tragic events, and anybody who had
25 anything to do with food aid for the Third World knows that

1 it is very much easier to halt famine before it occurs than
2 after it occurs. By that time, it is almost certainly too
3 late, and that is why I think our document and our research
4 is so important.

5 I would like to say a couple of other things, too. Of
6 course, the proper people to deal with this problem are the
7 international aid agencies, whether they be the U. N.
8 agencies or whether they be the great voluntary
9 organizations. The U. N. agencies, and, indeed, some other
10 bodies, particularly those dealing with medical aid like the
11 CIAC are prevented from their chances by operating in a
12 country without the okay of the government of that country.

13 I believe that the role of voluntary organizations like
14 mine is not only to substitute for those people who should be
15 doing the job but are unable to do so, but also to point the
16 way on how these things should be done, and the more
17 publicity we can get for our efforts, the more likely we are
18 to shame those agencies into doing what should be done.

19 Because when the history of this conflict comes to be
20 written, and I suspect that we are in for a 10-, 20- or
21 30-year struggle, after all, let us reverse the tables and
22 remember that it took the Soviets over 30 years to win in
23 Vietnam. But when the history of that conflict comes to be
24 written, people will sit up in UNICEF and United Nations
25 organizations and will say, "Wwhat were we doing?"

1 We were helping people in Pakistan, but purely for
2 political reasons, we could not help them where it was
3 clearly needed, and this will be an indictment to the
4 international agencies.

5 I think also it is worth saying that Commander Abdul
6 Haq's view of international pressure is very important. You
7 will remember, Senator, that Chairman Mao, who, after all was
8 a very fine guerilla commander, if not a very good ruler of
9 China, said that, "The fish have to have water to swim in."
10 It has been repeated so often by people in Afghanistan that
11 it has become something of a cliché, but nevertheless,
12 like so many clichés it is true. If the Mujahadeen are to
13 survive, they must survive surrounded by a population, not by
14 empty houses.

15 Therefore, if you want to help the struggle for freedom,
16 which I am delighted to find that you all do in this country,
17 then it is at least arguable that humanitarian need and
18 military need coincide and that humanitarian aid properly
19 delivered can have a very salutary effect on the survival of
20 the resistance fighters.

21 One other thing, if I may: I have heard you suggest
22 that sanctions might be available. Sanctions have been used
23 many times during the history of the United Nations. I seem
24 to remember them being used against Poland, a country which
25 members of my family already take large supplies of food and

1 medical supplies to anyway.

2 But I also remember them in the case of Rhodesia and
3 other instances back in history before my time before
4 Hitler's war. I do not believe in sanctions of an economic
5 kind. I do not think they work, and they merely make the
6 imposers seem ridiculous.

7 I would suggest that a more appropriate way for the
8 international community is to make sure that humanitarian aid
9 is channeled efficiently and professionally into the country;
10 that political support is given to those groups which are
11 most effective; and finally, that the international community
12 is kept so fully apprised of what is going on by courageous
13 journalists and others that the pressure will mount so that
14 eventually, like any guerilla war, however long it takes, it
15 is more trouble for the Soviets to stay in political,
16 economic and military terms but firstly, in the case of the
17 first two more than the last, for them to stay.

18 I would say, Senator, again, thank you for listening to
19 what I have to say, and I wish you the very best of luck in
20 your endeavors.

21

22 (Statement for the record follows:)

23

24

25



HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SW1A 0AA

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has resulted in widespread suffering among the country's c.15 million inhabitants. Over 3 millions have fled to Pakistan and perhaps 1½ millions to Iran. In Pakistan the world community and the Pakistani government have supplied the refugees with life's necessities. They are after all visible to all of us and able to wring our heartstrings.

The plight of those still in Afghanistan is difficult to assess accurately. Access is not easy and the glimpses the world has caught of what is happening have been the result of the efforts of a few brave spirits: free lance journalists and the representatives of voluntary humanitarian organisations.

In spite of the paucity of information it is clear that considerable distress exists in many parts of the country. The Russians have made some efforts to convince the Afghans of their tolerance of Islam, but in general they have tried to subjugate the



- 2 -

population rather than to win hearts and minds. Their methods have been brutal: they have systematically destroyed crops and livestock, they have bombed villages, schools and clinics and they have massacred large numbers of Afghans in reprisal for attacks on government forces.

I understand that the purpose of these hearings is to consider the question of humanitarian aid to the Afghans. I will therefore not refer any further to the politics of the situation. However, it was important for the committee to be under no illusions as to the cause of the suffering and the unusual circumstances under which any humanitarian aid to the Afghans really in need must be supplied.

So far humanitarian aid inside Afghanistan has been supplied on a small scale by a number of voluntary organisations. The fine work by the French doctors has perhaps received most publicity, but there are others in the field. Because access to the country is difficult and because of the lack of money these efforts have hitherto been generally conducted on a fairly ad hoc basis. Within these constraints some have been remarkably effective. Others, sadly,



- 3 -

have not, wasting scarce resources and, even more important, destroying the good reputation won for humanitarian aid by the more efficient operators.

If the world community is to send humanitarian help inside Afghanistan the age of the amateur is over.

The experience of Afghanaid, the British Charity of which I am Chairman, is perhaps instructive.

It became clear fairly early on, that parts of Afghanistan were facing serious food shortages. Accordingly, Afghanaid commissioned Dr. Frances d'Souza, a respected authority on famine in the Third World, to produce a report, "The Threat of Famine in Afghanistan." This report was published in May, 1984, and constitutes, as far as I know, the first attempt at an academic assessment of the position in certain parts of the country. It needs updating and expanding. Your committee, I think, has a copy.

/ Based on



- 4 -

Based on that report Afghanaid has developed a programme for sending help to one group covered by the report which in our view goes a long way towards overcoming the physical and political difficulties on the ground and towards satisfying the standards of accountability we ourselves or any potential donor would demand.

Dr. d'Souza has kindly prepared a memorandum entitled "Food Aid for Afghanistan", a copy of which I should like to leave with you. This sets out what basic foods 100,000 people would need for one month in one part of Afghanistan.

I should add that the cost of such an operation we estimate to be about £250,000 for one month, of which about a third would be the cost of transport.

Afghanistan is a diverse country. New research and a new scheme is necessary for each area. Nevertheless, Afghanaid hopes that its scheme will act as a pilot for a greater effort. I hope we have also shown how important proper research is for the success of any aid effort.

/ It has



- 5 -

It has been suggested that there is no actual famine in Afghanistan. Whether that is so or not, clearly there exists the threat of famine. We have seen in Ethiopia how rapidly that threat can be translated into actuality and how difficult it is to cope with famine once it exists. It is much easier to deal with threatened famine.

Finally, the international relief agencies are the right people, in an ideal world, to deal with this situation. Unfortunately, the United Nations agencies cannot operate in a country without its government's permission. It seems that there are U.N. agency representatives in Afghanistan but that for reasons of security they cannot operate beyond the suburbs of Kabul. For the time being, therefore, any one who wants to help the Afghans inside their country must do so by supporting the voluntary bodies now in the field.

1 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Thank you, Lord Cranborne. We will
2 call on Rosanne Klass now for her statement.

3
4 STATEMENT OF ROSANNE KLASS, DIRECTOR OF THE
5 AFGHANISTAN INFORMATION CENTER, FREEDOM HOUSE;
6 VICE PRESIDENT OF THE AFGHANISTAN RELIEF
7 COMMITTEE

8 MS. KLASS: Mr. Chairman, I would also like to thank you
9 for the opportunity to speak here today. I have been
10 studying and following events in Afghanistan since I first
11 lived there in the 1950. Since 1981 I have been devoting my
12 full-time attention to the developments in Afghanistan as
13 Director of the Afghanistan Information Center at Freedom
14 House, and I have been a member of the board and an officer
15 of the Afghanistan Relief Committee, which was set up in late
16 1979 before the Soviet invasion and which has subsequently
17 been funding aid to the population inside Afghanistan largely
18 through the French medical organizations and others.

19 Because of my background experience, I have been asked
20 to give you, in the short time summary, the context of some
21 of the events that you are hearing described. I also have
22 given to your staff a number of support items which will
23 provide other material. To understand the total ruthlessness
24 of Soviet actions in Afghanistan and their willingness to
25 destroy an entire people, if they have to, in order to

1 consolidate their hold, one has to recognize how long and how
2 persistent that Russia has been trying to get hold of this
3 territory.

4 For nearly 200 years, since 1791 at least, if not
5 earlier, Russia has doggedly pursued the goal of gaining
6 Afghanistan and using it as a springboard to reach the Indian
7 Ocean and its littoral nations.

8 These intentions are extensively documented,
9 particularly regarding the 19th and 20th centuries, first
10 half of the 20th century, when their efforts were blocked by
11 Britain, which was protecting its Indian empire.

12 If anyone doubts that Soviet policy is a continuation of
13 czarist policy, let me give you just a few quotes. In 1919,
14 Leon Trotsky, who had been Foreign Minister and was then
15 Commissar of War stated the road to Paris and London lies
16 through the towns of Afghan, the Punjab, which is now of
17 course Pakistan, and Bengal, which is now Bangladesh. More
18 than 50 years later, Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs, and
19 although they were apparently censored by the KGB, this was
20 not censored out, he noted that the highways that the Soviets
21 built for the Afghans in the 1950s and sixties were designed
22 for Soviet military transport in case of war with Iran or
23 Pakistan.

24 Among the materials I have provided to your Committee
25 are maps and other material of the mineral resources which

1 the Soviets also hope to and still plan to exploit in
2 Afghanistan, which are not insignificant and include a number
3 of strategic materials.

4 At any rate, having finally found their opportunity to
5 grasp a prize they coveted for so long, Moscow has shown, and
6 it has been well documented by other witnesses today, that it
7 is prepared to go to almost any length to confirm that
8 control and to make it permanent.

9 They were willing, when indirect methods failed, to send
10 in the Soviet Army despite the price they had to pay on the
11 international scene, including U. S.-Soviet relations;
12 detente and relations with the Third World. Obviously, it
13 was worth the price to them and continues to be.

14 And in connection with what Lord Cranborne was just
15 saying about keeping it before the public eye, I think it is
16 very important to keep it before the eyes of the so-called
17 Third World, which are the next potential targets.

18 When even the military, the use of the Soviet army
19 failed to quench the nationwide resistance of the Afghan
20 people, then they turned to these increasingly ferocious
21 techniques directed against the civilian population. And as
22 you look at the genocide convention, you will see that many
23 of them fit the definitions, the formal definitions of
24 genocide.

25 All evidence indicates that their goal is to batter the

1 Afghan population into submission and then, in the long run,
2 to transform it into Sovietized acquiescence, or failing
3 that, to drive the population out and empty the desired
4 territory, perhaps eventually resettling it with their own
5 people.

6 And there is some evidence-- or there is some reports. I
7 say, unconfirmed reports, that the settlement of Soviet
8 population has begun in certain areas.

9 Or, if neither of these is adequate, they are prepared
10 to kill the Afghans off, as simply as that, or use any
11 combination of the above. Leaders of the various communist
12 regimes installed since the bloody coup of April 1978, and it
13 should be noted that Barbrak Karmal, despite his present
14 protestations, was a participant in that coup and a
15 participant in that initial government, which repeatedly
16 declared publicly, as well as privately, that they needed no
17 more than one million Afghans to make the revolution and that
18 they didn't care what happened to the rest.

19 The Soviets obviously appear to share that view.
20 Although their forces, of course, use all the horrible
21 techniques and power of modern weaponry, their strategy and
22 tactics are not new. They have been tested by the Russians,
23 and they have been proven in earlier campaigns by both the
24 czarist army and the Soviets.

25 To some extent, they appear to be modeled on Genghis

1 Khan's invasion of Afghanistan in the years 1219 to 1221 was
2 which the Russians are very, very familiar. As I have
3 listened this morning, I have been thinking that more and
4 more that the model is Genghis Khan, as far-fetched as that
5 may sound in 1985.

6 But the techniques include a territory campaign of
7 atrocities against the civilian population, the destruction
8 not only of the agriculture, but when you destroy these
9 villages, you also destroy the entire social structure, and
10 you disperse peoples and you disperse communities, thereby
11 snattering the underlying overall social structure.

12 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Excuse me for interrupting. I am
13 going to have ask you to move along a little more quickly.

14 MS. KLASS: All right. The famine, in addition to
15 creating the conditions that have been discussed this
16 morning, depriving the population of medical aid,
17 humanitarian aid of any kind, increases the vulnerability and
18 helplessness, and their hopelessness potentially, and the
19 closing of the borders does the same.

20 The influx of refugees destabilizes Pakistan and Iran.

21 Now, you asked before whether they could be the
22 byproducts of war. They are to systematically applied. The
23 Russians used the technique of induced famine successfully in
24 the Caucasus in the 1850s in a very similar campaign. They
25 first destroyed the population base, destroyed popular

1 support, and then the military moved in and finished off the
2 Tchetchnens resistance. In the Ukraine, of course, we all know
3 about the death of millions, seven to ten million people, and
4 the present events in Ethiopia suggest that their satellites
5 are following the model.

6 I won't describe the actual destruction of the
7 agricultural base, because that has already been described.
8 But there is one difference between Afghanistan and, let's
9 say, the Ukraine. There was not this systematic attempt to
10 destroy the entire infrastructure of agriculture. This was,
11 however, done by Genghis Khan in the 13th century, which,
12 unlike his other campaigns, was an annihilation campaign.
13 At that time, the Mongol armies turned large portions of what
14 is today Afghanistan, which had been fertile farm land
15 irrigated for thousands of years, into a desert by destroying
16 those irrigation systems and they also massacred widely.

17 The result was that Afghanistan became a half-empty
18 country of deserts and what had once been one of the greatest
19 centers of civilization in the ancient world was depopulated
20 and left backward. The effects of the Genghis Kahn invasion
21 lasted, well, the first efforts really to reconstruct began
22 in the 1950s with the American-funded Helicon Valley
23 Authority. So it took 700 years to attempt to repair what
24 was done in the 13th century.

25 The Soviet army is known to be familiar with Mongol

1 military theory and military history. It is part of their
2 own history, and a number of their actions appear to be
3 direct imitations with modern techniques of the same events
4 being done.

5 You asked an earlier witness how much of this could be
6 accidental. In the village of Babarbishana (sic) in 1982,
7 after burning alive 105 men and boys in an underground
8 irrigation tunnel and damaging the tunnel, Soviet troops were
9 reported by eye witnesses to have applauded themselves and
10 cheered before they got into their vehicles and went back to
11 their base.

12 The hunger weapon, it should be noted, is being used
13 selectively. It is not just that some areas happen not to be
14 attacked. In addition, rural districts which stop supporting
15 the resistance and cooperate with the Kabul regime are
16 provided with the improved seed, with fertilizer, with
17 equipment, with Soviet experts to help them improve their
18 agriculture, and their irrigation facilities are improved for
19 them.

20 It is those which stubbornly refuse to knuckle under
21 which are devastated and left to starve.

22 As early as 1979, I began to hear reports of these
23 atrocities, and at that time, Soviet officers were commanding
24 down to the brigade level in the field and Soviet advisors
25 were in every ministry. So this is not a change; this is an

1 intensification, and we can expect that it will intensify
2 further.

3 I won't go into the weaponry and disease, but I will say
4 that the absence of medical care intensifies all of these
5 atrocities.

6 Now, out of a pre-Communist population of 15 million as
7 mentioned, between one-third and one-half of the nation has
8 been either killed or driven into exile. But the Afghans
9 still are fighting.

10 Babrak Karmal, at the beginning of last year, announced
11 and said repeatedly that 1984 would see the end of the
12 resistance. It is still going on, and the resistance which is
13 the Afghan people, the whole nation, is ready to fight on. I
14 want to make the point that nobody has told them to start.
15 This was a spontaneous resistance, and that nobody can tell
16 them to stop, and that any solution negotiated outside
17 without their participation, no matter in what good faith,
18 will not resolve the problem.

19 So we face an on-going problem, and I agree that it is
20 probably ten to 30 years a problem. But the question is, as
21 willing as they are to fight, whether they can continue to
22 watch their wives and children die of hunger, unable to do
23 anything to help them. The commander in the Panjsher Valley
24 last spring, facing his seventh Soviet offensive, told a
25 journalist that the worst sounds of war ringing in his ears

1 were not the explosions of the bombs but the cries of hungry
2 children. In this country, and in Europe, private agencies
3 are doing what they can to help the civilian population
4 inside Afghanistan, sometimes at grave personal risk. Some
5 of their personnel have been captured, including a French
6 doctor; many have become ill; several have died, been killed
7 in action, trying to alleviate the suffering of the Afghan
8 people.

9 I have attached, submitted some materials on this. But
10 private resources simply are not adequate to the full task.
11 It may be that private agencies are the best instrument
12 through which this can be done for various reasons of
13 international relations.

14 But they need additional resources. I can assure you
15 out of many years of experience, that ordinary Afghans,
16 even the kolis (sic) in the streets, know America; they know
17 America that stands for freedom, and they are fighting for
18 their freedom. But the question in their minds today, as
19 they struggle on is, very frankly, does the world not care?
20 That is where it is right now.

21 Thank you very much.
22
23
24
25

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AFGHANISTAN INFORMATION CENTER

Rosanne Klass, *Director*

ROSANNE KLOSS TESTIMONY BEFORE THE CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE ON AFGHANISTAN FEBRUARY 25, 1985

Mr. Chairman:

I have been studying and following events in Afghanistan I first lived there in since the 1950's. Since 1981 I have devoted my fulltime attention to developments there, as Director of the Afghanistan Information Center of Freedom House, a nonpartisan, non-governmental private organization which has for more than 40 years monitored political, civil and human rights around the world -- and also as a member of the Board of the Afghanistan Relief Committee, set up in 1980 to aid the victims of Soviet aggression in that country.

I have therefore been asked to give you, in brief summary, the context of some of the events presently unfolding in Afghanistan -- a framework for the reports on specific aspects of those events which you are hearing from other witnesses today and in subsequent sessions of these hearings.

To understand the total ruthlessness of Soviet actions in Afghanistan, and their willingness to destroy an entire people if necessary in order to consolidate their hold there,

(more)

one must recognize how long and persistently Russia has been trying to get control of this piece of territory.

For nearly 200 years -- since 1791 at least, if not earlier-- Russia has doggedly pursued the goal of gaining control of Afghanistan and using it as a springboard to reach the Indian Ocean and its littoral. These intensions are extensively documented. Throughout the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, those efforts were blocked by Britain, protecting its Indian empire. This was the famous "Great Game" -- the struggle to keep Russia from gaining a foothold in Southwest Asia.

Lest anyone doubt that Soviet policy in the area is a continuation of that of the czars, let me quote a few Soviet leaders:

In 1919, Leon Trotsky, then the Soviet Commissar of war, declared, "The road to Paris and London lies through the towns of Afghanistan, the Punjab, and Bengal."

Two decades later, in the secret clauses of the infamous Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939, Stalin demanded and got from Hitler a free hand in the entire area.

More than 20 years after that, Khrushchev noted in his memoirs that the highways Moscow built for the Afghans in the 1950s were designed for Soviet military transport in case of war with Iran or Pakistan.

Having finally grasped a prize so long coveted, Moscow has shown that it is prepared to go to extreme lengths to confirm that control and make it permanent. When comparatively indirect methods failed,

(more)

rather than see Afghanistan slip from their grasp they sent in the Soviet Army, despite the damaging effect of the invasion on their other international interests, including U.S.-Soviet relations, détente, etc.

When even this failed to quench the nationwide resistance of the Afghan people, they turned to increasingly ferocious techniques, largely directed against the civilian population, including many which fit the formal definitions of genocide. As the resistance continues, their efforts to crush it increase and intensify in horror.

All evidence indicates that their goal is to batter the Afghan population into submission and subvert it, in the long run, into Sovietized acquiescence;

--or, failing that, to drive the population out and empty the desired territory, perhaps resettling it later with their own people;

--or, if necessary, to kill the Afghans off;

--or any combination of the above.

Leaders of the various communist regimes installed since the bloody coup of April 1978 -- and it should be remembered that Babrak Karmal took part in that coup and was originally a leading member of the Taraki/Amin regime -- repeatedly declared that they needed no more than one million Afghans to make the revolution and didn't care what happened to the rest. There is no evidence that the Soviet view is different, and extensive evidence that it is the same.

Although Soviet forces can now utilize the full force of modern weaponry to terrorize and destroy, their tactics have been tested

(more)

and proved in earlier Czarist and Soviet actions, and in some degree even appear to be modelled on Genghis Khan's invasion of Afghanistan in the year 1219.

These include:

- a terror campaign of atrocities against the civilian population,

- the destruction of the social structure and dispersal of peoples and the community,

- the deliberate creation of famine conditions through the systematic destruction of crops and farm animals and the prevention of agricultural activities,

- and a literal scorched-earth policy of wiping out, perhaps permanently, the agricultural base which can enable the civilian population to physically survive and return, doing this by destroying centuries-old irrigation systems and turning fertile irrigated land into a desert.

Depriving the population of medical aid, humanitarian aid of any kind, and any surcease from all these horrors further isolates them and increases their vulnerability and helplessness -- and potentially their hopelessness, compounded by Soviet determination to close Afghanistan to outside witnesses and press, and prevent the world from knowing what their forces and their puppets are doing. [Recently Moscow's ambassador to Islamabad stated that any journalists captured in future will be "eliminated."]

And of course the influx of masses of refugees serves to burden and destabilize neighboring countries subject to Soviet pressures for acquiescence in the seizure of Afghanistan.

(more)

It should be emphasized that these are not merely the unavoidable tragic byproducts of war; they are systematically applied strategies and tactics.

Induced famine, for example, is a technique with which the Russians have considerable experience. Russian forces used it successfully in the Caucasus in the 1850s against the Tchetchen people led by the legendary Shamil in their struggle against czarist conquest --a campaign similar in some respects to that in Afghanistan. Deliberately-created famine led to the collapse of popular support for Shamil; then the Cossacks moved in and destroyed his dwindling forces militarily.

The use of the famine instrument was perfected in ferocity and magnitude in the Ukraine in 1932-33, when Stalin deliberately starved to death an estimated seven to ten million people and thereby succeeded in eliminating resistance to his policies. Thus the famine weapon is known to work, and Soviet rulers have, demonstrably, no compunction about using it.

Indeed, their experience has served as a model for their satellites: press reports indicate that starvation is being used as a political weapon today in Marxist Ethiopia, where, reportedly, international food aid is being withheld from the starving in the areas fighting the Addis Ababa regime, and is hunger is being used to force the resettlement of recalcitrant populations to controlled areas.

In Afghanistan, Soviet aircraft bomb, strafe, and rocket the farm villages in which most of the population lives.

They rocket and strafe

(more)

farmers trying to work their fields and shepherds with their flocks, preventing planting and irrigation. They machine-gun flocks and farm animals, even poultry. Orchards and vineyards are cut to the ground. After the harvest is gathered, granaries are rocketed with incendiaries. Soviet ground forces enter the villages, systematically looting and destroying food supplies and killing stock. I attach eyewitness accounts of village-by-village devastation in one or two areas; other witnesses will be able to tell you their own observations.

In addition, Soviet forces seem to be basing some of their tactics on the model of Genghis Khan's invasion of Afghanistan in the 13th century, a campaign of annihilation in which vast areas which had been fertile farmland for thousands of years were turned permanently into desert by destroying the underground water and irrigation systems; and what had once been a major center of high civilization was depopulated and left backward. When I first lived in Afghanistan in the 1950s, the name of Genghis Khan still evoked a shudder of horror, after more than 700 years.

The Soviet army is known to be conversant with Mongol military history, which affected their own history; and the parallels between some of their actions -- the destruction of the water systems, the poisoning of wells, etc. -- suggests that they are imitating some of these tactics, both for their effectiveness and perhaps also to reawaken the national memory of that ancient horror and reinforce the effects of the present one.

It should be noted that the hunger weapon, the suffering weapon, is used cleverly and selectively:

(more)

Rural districts which stop supporting the Resistance and cooperate with the central regime are not attacked. On the contrary, their farmers are provided with improved seed, fertilizer, equipment, and improved irrigation facilities -- while those areas that stubbornly support the Resistance are devastated and left to suffer and starve.

I will not go into the details of atrocities against the civilian population, urban as well as rural. Prof. Rubin has given you testimony on his detailed investigations, as will others, and I attach other information.

I will only make two points:

-- that as early as 1979, I heard atrocity reports from villagers driven to become refugees in Pakistan. At that time, Soviet officers were commanding in the field down to the brigade level and Soviet advisers were sitting in every ministry in Kabul; thus the present situation represents an intensification rather than a change of policy, and further intensification may occur.

-- The second point is that many Soviet weapons and tactics are designed to wound and maim; in addition, their tactics bring them the assistance of nature's weapons: exposure, hunger, cold, and social chaos breed disease. Already measles, tuberculosis, and other diseases are re-emerging and killing; and gangrene and tetanus follow wounds.

The absence of medical care intensifies all these horrors.

(more)

What are the results of these tactics so far, after more than six years?

Out of a pre-communist population estimated at 15 million, it is estimated that three-quarters of a million to one million Afghans have died from injuries, war-related disease, and slaughter. This includes an estimated 200- to 500,000 outright executions by the regime and by Soviet forces.

Nearly six million Afghans are refugees -- three million of them in Pakistan, a reported 1.5 million in Iran, and another million or more inside their own country, a large proportion of these in Kabul. [This bears comparison with the established Soviet technique of the forcible resettlement of peoples within the U.S.S.R., and current actions in Ethiopia, again.]

That's almost half a country.

But still the Afghan people fight on, determined to regain their freedom and defend their faith. Babrak Karmal and other spokesmen for the puppet regime in Kabul repeatedly declared that 1984 would see the end of the Resistance.

Yet It is now February 1985, and the struggle goes on as fiercely, as ever. The Resistance -- which is the Afghan people -- are willing and ready to fight on. Nobody told them to start, and nobody can tell them to stop.

But can they watch their wives and children starve and sicken and die, unable to defend or help them? And must they do so? The commander in the Panjsher Valley, facing his seventh Soviet offensive, told a journalist last year that the worst sound of war ringing in his ears was not the explosion of bombs but the cries of hungry children.

(more)

Private agencies in this country and in Europe have done what they can, sometimes at grave personnel risk: some of their personnel have been captured, some have become ill, and some have died, trying to alleviate the suffering of the Afghan people.

But private resources are simply not adequate to the full task.

The question in the minds of Afghans today, as they struggle on, is, Does the world not care?

Thank you.

X X X

List of attachments follows

ATTACHMENTS:

- . Report by Swedish journalist Børje Almqvist on the destruction of villages in the Logar Valley observed by him at the end of 1983. contains village-by-village statistics and details: original number of families, remaining number of families, details of Soviet attacks, killings, etc. Sent as a memo to Michael Williams, Amnesty International, London.
2. Title page and introduction to the Final Report of the International Afghanistan hearings held in Oslo, 13-16 March 1983. [The complete report is in my files, or may still be available from the ad hoc Hearings committee in Oslo. Included, as an example of the testimony, is the second questioning of police colonel Mohammad Ayub Assil, who later visited the U.S. and provided Prof. Barnett Rubin with considerable information about the prisons and torture.
3. Associated Press report by Richard Bill on eyewitness description of devastation in the Panjsher Valley, 1984.
4. Telegram to John Train, then Executive Vice President (now President) of the Afghanistan Relief Committee, and his response. The cable from Dr. Claude Malhuret is a call for emergency aid to prevent famine in the Panjsher Valley in early 1983; the response shows what private groups can do if the funding is available.
5. Report of a conference on the food situation in Afghanistan, held by the key French aid groups on October 28, 1984.
6. Representative newspaper reports of atrocities, including the bombing of French hospitals.
7. Article on atrocities in Afghanistan, 1978-79 [i.e., preceding the Soviet invasion, during the period when an estimated 8000-10,000 Soviet advisors and officers were already established in the Afghan government.] by Michael Barry; COMMENTARY magazine, August 1982. This was the first major article on the subject published in the U.S. It received little attention.

1 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Thank you. Let me ask the witnesses
2 once again to keep their statements to ten minutes.
3 Otherwise, we won't have an audience to participate in this
4 event. We may not have panelists or Congressmen and
5 Senators.

6 Jack?

7
8 STATEMENT OF DR. JACK WHEELER, DIRECTOR OF THE
9 FREEDOM RESEARCH FOUNDATION

10 DR. WHEELER: Thank you, Senator. It certainly is a
11 pleasure being here. I certainly want to congratulate you
12 and all the people on your Task Force for having such an
13 extraordinary session here. All of you are really to be
14 congratulated. As part of my on-going study of anti-Marxist
15 democratic liberation movements throughout the Third World,
16 I have entered Afghanistan accompanying various groups of
17 Afghan freedom fighters or Mujahaddin, three times in the
18 past years and a half. Traveling over a total of some 2000
19 kilometers inside the country, I have been through Paktia,
20 Nangahar and Kabul provinces, including the outskirts of
21 Kabul, the capital; and through Paktika Zabul and Ghazni
22 provinces, from the Baluchistan border up into the central
23 mountains of the Hazarajat and inside the city of Ghazni,
24 Afghanistan's fourth largest city.

25 Mostly, I traveled openly in the daytime and learned

1 first-hand that there is no central government today in
2 Afghanistan. The regime of Babrak Karmal, installed in Kabul
3 in 1979 by a Soviet occupation army in a similar manner as a
4 Vietnamese occupation army installed the Heng Samrin regime
5 in Cambodia that same year, exercises no authority whatever
6 over the vast majority of the country. Karmali soldiers and
7 Soviet invasion forces control most parts of the major cities
8 during the day, but it is quite lethal for them to venture
9 out at night. Anytime troops from one of the scattered
10 garrisons in the countryside goes beyond the garrison's
11 walls, they are met with stiff resistance from the Mujahaddin
12 guerrillas. Indeed, the Soviets have far less freedom of
13 movement on the ground in Afghanistan today than did the
14 British during the Afghan wars of the British Raj.

15 There are perhaps two to three times as many Mujahaddin
16 as the some 150,000 Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan. and I
17 myself have been many thousands of Mujahaddin personally,
18 most of whom were armed with single shot bolt action
19 carbines, often of pre-World War I vintage. But of these
20 multitudes, perhaps no more than 30 to 90,000 are fighting at
21 any one given time throughout the country due to severe
22 shortages in arms, ammunition, equipment, boots, winter
23 clothing, blankets, food, medicine, first aid supplies and
24 pack animals or vehicles for transportation.

25 Given this, it should really be quite instructive for

1 the Pentagon, for NATO, and for all those nervous souls in
 2 Foggy Bottom so intimidated by the Russian bear, that the
 3 vaunted Red Army has been fought to a humiliating standstill
 4 by the Mujahaddin.

5 Incapable of defeating the Afghan people militarily--and
 6 they would if they could, but they can't--the Kremlin has
 7 resorted to its standard strategy in coping with wide-spread
 8 resistance to its imperialism: manufactured famine and the
 9 mass-slaughter of civilians. Just as Stalin purposefully
 10 starved to death from 1929 to 1936 over ten million Ukrainians
 11 and Russian peasants rebelling against the forced
 12 collectivization of their land and deported over 600,000
 13 Balts to their death in Siberia to break Baltic liberation
 14 movements after World War II, so his heirs are today
 15 engineering the death by starvation of hundreds of thousands
 16 of Tigreans and Eritreans in Ethiopia and are bombing into
 17 rubbleized obliteration thousands of villages in Afghanistan.

18 I experienced a depressingly common sight when walking
 19 across the mountains of Afghanistan. Upon coming to the top
 20 of a pass, a beautiful valley would appear
 21 beneath us: green terraces of corn, orchards and shade
 22 trees, picturesque villages, a picture post card.
 23 That was at a distance. Close up, we would discover it was a
 24 ghost valley; everything shattered and destroyed by the
 25 Shuravi; the skeletons of homes and villages bombed out;

1 fields turning to weeds; orchards of mulberry, apple and
2 apricot trees untended; all abandoned and uninhabited save
3 for a few remaining families, especially old people, and an
4 occasional Mujahid tea house.

5 I have personally seen scores upon scores of Afghan
6 villages that have been reduced to rubble by Soviet bombs;
7 gardens bombed; fields napalmed, laid pocketed with bomb
8 craters, and sown with anti-personnel
9 mines: karezes
10 bombed; irrigation ditches and dikes bombed; wells bombed
11 with pinpoint accuracy, no collateral damage, pinpoint
12 accuracy, so that the surrounding fields they irrigated have
13 turned to desert.

14 I had some slides, but the airlines lost my luggage
15 yesterday, so I'm sorry, I don't have the slides, but I have
16 a slide presentation that can document all this
17 photographically.

18 Standing amidst this destruction, I was often asked by
19 Afghan villagers and Mujahaddins, "We keep hearing stories
20 that that America is spending much money to help us. How can
21 this be true when we never see any evidence from your
22 country? " I do not know to what extent press reports on
23 alleged U. S. covert aid to Afghanistan are accurate. Nor do
24 I possess a detailed accurate breakdown of its dispersal.
25 What I do know is that the Mujahaddins to whom I talked in

1 Afghanistan believe that a vast amount of American money is
2 being siphoned off in neighboring countries before it or the
3 supplies it is supposed to buy reaches them. True or not,
4 this perception is itself a serious problem and an undeniable
5 reality.

6 There is a very interesting quote from Commander Haq.
7 What is required as a necessary condition for effective
8 outside assistance is an end to State Department policy of
9 never talking to Afghans directly in Pakistan--you ask
10 Haq--and to abandon its determination that no traceable
11 American money be spent inside Afghanistan. Indeed, the era
12 of plausible deniability should be abandoned altogether.
13 What is required is accountability for outside assistance, an
14 end to the arm's length timidity which entails a host of
15 middlemen between us and the Mujahaddin. What is required is
16 that we deal with the Mujahaddin, who are effective, and not
17 those who are corrupt.

18 Of the seven primary Mujahaddin organizations
19 headquartered in Peshawar, the most effective and least
20 corrupt are Jamiat Islami, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, and
21 that of Younis Khalis. The most corrupt are the Hezbis of
22 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and that of Rasul Sayyaf. Gulbuddin has
23 aligned himself with the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran and is
24 clearly sabotaging the resistance, and it is about time
25 somebody said it. It is my suggestion that representatives

1 of our government deal primarily and in person with Rabanni
2 and Knaiss and their representatives in Peshawar and make
3 every effort to see no American assistance goes to either
4 Gulbiddin or Sayyaf. They should also respectfully request
5 that the Saudis do the same.

6 Further, they should direct assistance straight, direct,
7 to the principal regional commanders inside Afghanistan, such
8 as Abdul Haq in Kabul, Shafi-olla in Koh-i-Safi, Ahmad Shah
9 Massoud in Panjsher, Ismail Khan in Herat, Mohammad Shah
10 Phazi in Ferah, Qari Baba Taj Mohammad in Ghazni, Amin Wardak
11 in Wardak, and Jalal-ud-din in Paktia.

12 In addition, our embassy in Pakistan should encourage,
13 instead of trying to inhibit, private groups such as the
14 International Medical Corps, the Committee for a free
15 Afghanistan, Afghanistan, MSF and others in setting up PVO
16 offices in Peshawar for the express purpose of channeling
17 private relief aid across the border into Afghanistan.

18 You can confer with Monsieur Crouan. He has received no
19 cooperation in his efforts with MSF through the United States
20 embassy.

21 The Soviets are desperately afraid that the world will
22 learn the truth in Afghanistan. The Administration and
23 Congress should encourage the news media to cover the Afghan
24 war comprehensively, Soviets threats or not. It is disgraceful
25 that not one of the big five of American media, the New York

1 Times, The Washington Post, ABC, CBS nor NBC, have
2 correspondents stationed in Peshawar to cover the war
3 full-time, not one. Our embassy in Islamabad should be
4 giving every bit of encouragement and assistance possible to
5 enable professional journalists who, believe me, are not
6 going to be intimidated by Soviet threats, to report on
7 Afghanistan from the inside. Once the American public sees
8 for themselves on their television screens the plight of the
9 Afghan people and knows that humanitarian assistance will
10 reach those struggling inside Afghanistan, they will respond
11 as they have when they made aware of the flight of Ethiopians.

12 Assistance must include money for transportation and
13 motor fuel. Pack animals and vehicles have to be rented,
14 traders given an incentive to open roads and trails. The
15 Mujahaddins are becoming increasingly motorized and have a
16 significant potential to become much more so. Large
17 quantities of food and other desperately needed humanitarian
18 assistance such as winter clothes, blankets, livestock,
19 fertilizer, feedstocks, vitamins and medical supplies can be
20 taken from Pakistan into eastern Afghanistan. But sending
21 money rather than food may be more practical to certain areas
22 far from the border, which will help local markets and
23 revitalize agricultural activities, by providing an incentive
24 for farmers to stay and farm.

25 There may be good reasons for being discreet with

1 military said to the Afghans, but none whatever, no
2 justification for being coy regarding humanitarian aid. We
3 have every moral right on the face of this earth to go in
4 with flags flying to help starving and brutalized Afghans
5 suffering from Communist genocidal terror.

6 That is why, for example, the refusal of AID and its
7 director, Peter McPherson, to fund the efforts of Dr. Robert
8 Simon in getting American medical surgical teams to Afghan
9 villages is so shameful.

10 Such humanitarian aid is not only vital for the
11 Mujahaddin resistance, but for the very survival of the
12 Afghan nation. One cannot eat bullets. It does not matter
13 how many Dashaka machine guns are sent if food is not sent as
14 well. If humanitarian aid is sent to Afghan civilians, they
15 will stay to farm and help the resistance. If not, then the
16 struggle to keep Afghanistan free is lost, and the country
17 will be depopulated. As Ahmad Shah Massoud wrote in a recent
18 letter, "I am not afraid of the Russians, but I am afraid of
19 a crying, starving baby."

20 It is crucially important to realize, however, that the
21 obverse is equally true: all the humanitarian aid in the
22 world will be wasted if the Afghans remain defenseless in the
23 face of Soviet MiGs and helicopter gunships. Eighty percent
24 of Soviet combat and logistical operations in Afghanistan are
25 airborne. Only with appropriate anti-aircraft weapons, such

1 as the 20 millimeter cannons and the Redeye or Stinger
2 portable heat- seeking missile can the villages, fields and
3 irrigation systems be protected, the hemorrhaging of refugees
4 into Pakistan or Iran be stanchèd and refugees encouragèd to
5 return to their villages to repopulate the country. That's
6 the only way you're going to do it.

7 No agency of our government should be allowed to veto
8 the provision of the Redeyes to the Mujahaddin. The Soviets
9 have shown on no reluctance whatever to supply guerrilla
10 forces such as SWAPO and the PLO and so many others with
11 massive quantities of their own Soviet-made weapons. We need
12 show no reluctance to do likewise with American materiel, as,
13 indeed, we were supplying to the FDN contras in Nicaragua.

14 Afghanistan is becoming a major fork in the road of
15 history. It is by no means a foregone conclusion that the
16 Soviets will ultimately win in Afghanistan. We can help the
17 Mujahaddin resist Soviet imperialism and Marxist fascism, and
18 the Afghan people survive as a nation and as a culture. If
19 Soviet aggression is not stoppèd in Afghanistan, it will
20 spread like a glacier throughout all of southwest Asia, first
21 to Baluchistan and ineluctably towards the Saudi oilfields.
22 The Soviet Union bases its claim to superpower status on
23 military force alone. Only when that force ceases to be
24 capable of achieving the continued expansion of the Soviet
25 state will the Soviet Union turn inward to try and solve its

1 gross economic and demographic difficulties. This is the
2 only hope for a genuine and lasting peace for Afghanistan and
3 the entire world.

4 I thank you very, very much.

5 (Applause.)

6 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Thank you. Thank you, Dr. Wheeler.
7 Our next witness does not appear on the agenda but asked to
8 speak. He is Dr. Antoine Crouan of Medecins San Frontieres.

9
10 STATEMENT OF DR. ANTOINE CROUAN, MEDECINS SAN
11 FRONTIERES

12 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Dr. Crouan, do you have an opening
13 statement?

14 DR. CROUAN: Sorry?

15 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Do you wish to make an opening
16 statement before we proceed to questioning?

17 DR. CROUAN: Just a few things. Normally my colleague
18 will do a more important report this week, so I don't want to
19 take his place. If you want, I can add some things about the
20 famine.

21 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Hunger, famine, yes.

22 DR. CROUAN: For the last five years, Medecins san
23 Frontieres has been working inside of Afghanistan all the
24 time, and since 1980 around 115 medical physicians, doctors
25 and nurses have worked on all different places in

1 Afghanistan. I would like to tell what we feel and what we
2 think about the famine. '84 was practically a grim year for
3 food supply in Afghanistan for three main reasons well
4 described: a sharp increase in Soviet and Afghan troop
5 activities in those areas; second, the poor weather
6 conditions, specifically, lack of precipitations; and third,
7 the continued flight of thousands of peasants seeking refuge
8 in Pakistan and India.

9 I would like to put the gravity of the situation; I
10 would add three other objective reasons: first of all, the
11 number of the observers returning from all the region of
12 Afghanistan tell the same things: we have unanimity about
13 the reports.

14 Second, the increase of the price of the food. We have
15 made a little survey in three different regions of
16 Afghanistan. Wheat, from our turn '83 to '84, inflation of
17 65 percent; rice, 73 percent; tea, 66 percent and sugar, 46
18 percent.

19 The third reason: for the first time, dating from
20 beginning of the war, the resistance request food before
21 arms, and this is very, very important. And fourth, the
22 medical purpose, our own medical survey, it is difficult. We
23 are not--it is really difficult to do scientific medical
24 surveys in Afghanistan because of the situation. But I would
25 like to take one example in Peshawar. After working three

1 years in Peshawar, according to all these medical reports, we
2 have noted five different interesting changes.

3 First, there was a three-fold increase in the incidence
4 of malaria between 1982 and 1984. The World Health
5 Organization, with malaria prevention program, cannot do any
6 more now.

7 Second, there was a five-fold increase in the number of
8 war injuries, of course, and especially in the civilian
9 population. There was a marked increase in the incidence of
10 serious malnutrition in women and children. Four, there was
11 a two-fold increase of all infectious disease as tuberculosis
12 or measles for two reasons. The population is more
13 concentrated now because of the destruction of houses and we
14 have more bombing. Second, the stop of all vaccination
15 campaigns.

16 The third one is the situation of, as I said, it is
17 quite impossible to do a very scientific nutritional survey,
18 but one of the most important indicated and most samples
19 indicated, the infant mortality and in the Buris Province
20 (sic) in the north of Peshawar, a northern area of Aslakasha
21 (sic) there exists a high infant mortality, approximately 45
22 percent.

23 That is all.

24 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Thank you, Dr. Crouan. are,
25 Lord Cranborne, first of all, congratulations on all that you

1 have done and on the publication of the report. Is there any
2 question in your mind or is it the position of your
3 organizations that the Soviets are conducting deliberate
4 destruction of agriculture so as to bring about starvation?

5 LORD CRANBORNE: No doubt at all.

6 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: As a key element in the program of
7 genocide?

8 LORD CRANBORNE: I think--I don't want to quote, but I
9 would be doubtful about the word genocide. I don't think
10 they mind very much whether they kill people or don't. What
11 they want to do is subjugate the country. I don't think like
12 Hitler and the Jews, they wanted to exterminate the race.
13 That would be wrong, and I rather deprecate the use of the
14 word genocide.

15 I think the important thing is that they wanted to
16 subjugate the country and the idea of hearts and minds
17 is not something they give much attention to, although they
18 have tried to convince the population from time to time that
19 they don't disapprove of Islam but it has always been an
20 effort, to my mind, slightly lacking in believability or
21 credibility.

22 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: You stated something about examples
23 of indiscriminate aid which you implied had been wasteful.
24 Can you give examples?

25 LORD CRANBORNE: I could. I don't think it would be

1 tremendously productive.

2 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Why were they wasteful, then?

3 LORD CRANBORNE: Well, I don't want to abuse your
4 hospitality but I can think of one aircraft from the United
5 States which some months ago, if you press me, appeared, I
6 understand, in Peshawar with a great many medicines donated
7 by the generosity of the American people. I understand that
8 a very substantial part of those medicines were useless or
9 worse, and I believe very high proportions of-- this is
10 hearsay, I must say, not something that I have seen directly
11 myself, but a high proportion of the cargo of that airplane
12 consisted of the drug Tylenol, which had a certain perception
13 of notoriety in this country, I believe, at one point.

14 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: How do we avoid that kind of waste?

15 LORD CRANBORNE: I think the first thing is to make sure
16 that the program, the programs themselves inside the country
17 are well researched, as I said, and that the organizations
18 which are conducting the programs are respectable, well-
19 found and staffed by people who know what they're doing.

20 I also think that it is very important that once a
21 program has been initiated that it should be well monitored
22 and that at all times we should know or that the
23 organizations conducting the program should know what is
24 going on and that they should send people in to supplement
25 the arrangements that they might have made inside the country

1 to make sure that things were going as they would wish.

2 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: In short, are you saying that we
3 should deal with each of the organizations and agency that
4 have been there and have some experience?

5 LORD CRANBORNE: I think if you want to give some help
6 quickly, yes, that is so, but I would hate for anybody to
7 think that I have been indulging in any form of preventative
8 practice and preventing anybody else from coming and taking a
9 crack at it, as well.

10 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: You said vast sums of money would be
11 poured willy-nilly into willing hands. What does that mean?

12 LORD CRANBORNE: Oh, sorry. I clearly gave the wrong
13 impression. I say it is very easy, or what I meant to say,
14 when our heartstrings are rung for generous people,
15 particularly like the Americans, to pour vast sums of money
16 into willing hands.

17 If that money goes to waste, it is an undesirable thing
18 to happen.

19 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: I thought when you made that
20 statement earlier, I thought you were referring to the
21 urgency of the situation and the level of aid necessary.

22 LORD CRANBORNE: Oh, yes. Unquestionably, the situation
23 is urgent. Perhaps I should clarify. I believe that is the
24 technical term in this country when one hasn't got one's
25 meaning across right.

1 I think the important thing is that aid that is given
2 should be well-directed, well-accounted for, and I think it
3 is more important that that should happen rather than that
4 vast sums should be spent. You don't want to throw big
5 dollars at a problem and assume that it is going to work
6 because a lot of dollars are there.

7 Certainly, it will only encourage corruption in
8 northwest province, for instance, and in the Provinces in
9 Galuknan (sic), two provinces in Pakistan which border
10 Afghanistan, and I would suspect that that would do more harm
11 than good.

12 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: According to the pre-famine
13 indicators, is it your opinion that famine exists or that
14 famine is impending? What is the bottom line?

15 LORD CRANBORNE: The bottom line is I think there is a
16 threat of famine, and clearly, this season isn't going to
17 help. We have heard reports of increased Soviet activity,
18 particularly in the border provinces, and it is clear that
19 there has been an increase in their level of activity. I
20 would suspect that that has made the threat this winter even
21 more severe than it has been in the past.

22 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Do you know anything about the
23 snowfall this year, this winter?

24 LORD CRANBORNE: I haven't been in that part of the
25 world this winter. I would suggest that you should refer to

1 the gentleman who was giving the practical eye witness
2 evidence before.

3 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Nevertheless, irrespective of what
4 the snowfall might be, irrespective of the fact that the
5 Soviets have greatly stepped up military operations, you are
6 saying, are you not, in your statement, that the pre-famine
7 indicators are there; that it is time to take them seriously,
8 and that so far we have not?

9 LORD CRANBORNE: That is absolutely right, particularly
10 when you realize that this is the only time when you can take
11 them seriously and expect to do something about it. If
12 famine actually happens, and it can happen very quickly, as
13 Dr. D'Souze makes abundantly clear, if you do something about
14 it once famine has occurred, you find that all your efforts
15 may have easily be in vain.

16 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Yes. Yes.

17 Let me give Congressman Ritter a chance to put some
18 questions.

19 MR. RITTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank our
20 witnesses for some very excellent information. I would just
21 like to focus on Rosanne Klass for a moment. The sources of
22 our information on famine, I am just trying to get an idea of
23 the timeliness and how active they are and in relating to
24 what Lord Cranborne was saying, it can happen awfully fast.
25 Where are we right now in this attempt?

1 Obviously, we are here not just to talk about famine,
2 but to head it off at the pass, so to speak, no pun intended.
3 There are a lot of passes, but where are we now? Are we at a
4 point where, if we do not act within the next one week, one
5 month, one year, we can see massive overwhelming famine and
6 really the collapse of the resistance?

7 MS. KLASS: Some of what you are asking, I think, calls
8 for a technical analysis that perhaps the British Committee,
9 the French doctors and others working in the field who are
10 professionals can, in such matters, can better answer. I
11 think Lord Cranborne has just given you something of an
12 answer on that.

13 But in terms of the reports I hear and the reports I
14 see, I have, for the first time, begun to see photographs of
15 children with matchsticked arms and the swollen bellies,
16 which you did not see before, and incidentally, this is
17 perhaps a moment in which I might answer Senator Humphrey's
18 question. I do know something about the diet before the
19 communist take-over.

20 Afghanistan had very, very seldom had famines. There
21 was a famine in one section of the country in 1970 into 1972,
22 and it came as an enormous shock, because famine is not
23 common in Afghanistan.

24 Before the Soviet take-over, the Communist take-over in
25 1978, the average diet was very heavy in fruits; very heavy

1 in proteins; a lot of eggs; a lot of chicken; quite a bit of
2 mutton; not so much beef. Beef was not a preferred meat, but
3 lots and lots of fruits. The average breakfast would be,
4 let's say, a piece of bread, tea with sugar and a hard-boiled
5 egg or two. Lunch was probably bread and rice with eggs or
6 something of this sort. Dinner was very often a rice dish
7 with chicken and all along the way enormous consumption of
8 fruits.

9 The child mortality rate was very high, but it was not a
10 result of malnutrition; it was the result of childhood
11 diseases. It was particularly high below the age of two and
12 it was, as I say, largely the result of diseases, including
13 dysentery, which was the result of, among other things, lack
14 of an adequately safe water supply.

15 Famine was not a common thing. As I say, I have begun
16 to see photographs of the sort that you are seeing en masse
17 coming out of Ethiopia, and I hope that perhaps next week Dr.
18 Forneau will be able to bring you some of those photographs.
19 I think we are facing a very grave situation. I would agree
20 with Jack Wheeler that the call now is beginning to be for
21 food, number one; Number two, medical assistance; number
22 three, which is not so much of an emergency at the moment,
23 aid for education in the villages inside, and that is
24 important. I hope someone will get to it. That would be a
25 long-term concern.

1 Something just flipped through my mind. In terms of
2 wasted aid in the private sector, you are never going to be
3 able to avoid it entirely. There are warehouses of clothing
4 that have been donated by good- hearted Americans right now
5 out in California. There is a group picking lemons and limes
6 to ship over to be trekked into Afghanistan because they have
7 heard of a vitamin shortage. I have tried to suggest to them
8 that vitamin tablets would be an easier way to do it. But
9 they are picking lemons and limes and crating them and
10 planning to ship them.

11 You cannot stop that, but if a major official campaign
12 begins, I think that even there, the private organizations
13 will see that that is not the best way to do things and will
14 follow the official leadership.

15 MR. RITTER: Let me follow up on that for a moment. Do
16 the private organizations have the ability to funnel in vast
17 quantities of food? Lord Cranborne was talking about just
18 this one test area. What mechanisms exist to supply these
19 vast quantities?

20 MS. KLASS: I can, again, only speak from my own
21 experience. The Afghanistan Relief Committee is the primary
22 aid committee in this country. Because our funds are very
23 limited, we have decided not to set up an office in Peshawar;
24 that we can better use our funds for the actual aid, and we
25 have utilized, we have given it to support organizations that

1 are already operating there, particularly the Afghan doctors,
2 the French doctors who are going inside; particularly
3 Medecins Sans Frontieres and Medical International, and
4 the Swedish Committee which is established and has its
5 connections and contacts, and I believe we are having some
6 discussions with the British committee, and we have been in
7 touch with a number of European committees which already are
8 in place. And we feel up to now, at least, that they haven't
9 needed duplication and the expenditure of limited funds on
10 establishing a separate agency.

11 The French doctors have, in addition to the medical aid
12 which we have supported, they have, on occasion, carried in
13 money for food. For example, two years ago, we received a
14 cable from the director of Medecins Sans Frontieres, saying
15 he had just received word from the Panjsher Valley saying
16 they were needing aid; \$40,000 in some aid was cabled to
17 Paris, and it was transferred to Pakistan and it went inside.
18 You do not need massive organizations for the transfer of
19 funds, and to a large extent, in the food arena, it appears
20 that the transfer of funds rather than the attempt to
21 transport actual quantities of food may be needed.

22 In the question of medical supplies, of course, those
23 are not so readily available. Those have to be transported,
24 but they are much smaller numbers. I am told that the
25 logistical support now is very difficult; that there is a

1 great shortage of donkeys, or horses, of camels; many have
2 been killed, and therefore, the best way to do it is
3 apparently the way that requires the least transportation,
4 the least logistical problems and of course, someone can take
5 any quantity of funds in his pocket.

6 MR. RITTER: Let me hear from Lord Cranborne.

7 LORD CRANBORNE: Yes, I broadly agree with what Ms.
8 Klass is saying. I think it is very important to understand
9 that Afghanistan is not one country geographically. It is a
10 great patchwork of different geographical characteristics,
11 and I think it is fair to say that as far as we can tell at
12 the moment, there are three areas which are in very severe
13 need, at least three. One is Badakhshan, which you have
14 heard something about from the previous panel; one
15 is--Afghan's will have to forgive my pronunciation--Ghour,
16 G-h-o-u-r, and also there are areas around the the Panjshir,
17 which is a considerable pace from the Soviets, over the last
18 few years.

19 There are other areas at risk, particularly in western
20 Herat Province; Farah, where you will see from our own study
21 that there are some severe indicators, but not ones which I
22 am told are statistically significant.

23 Of course, Kandahar, but they are easier to reach,
24 because they are nearer the border. In principle, at the
25 moment, the areas of severe need can only really simply be

1 helped by the transfer of money.

2 MR. RITTER: The money, how does that work? They simply
3 reproduce--

4 LORD CRANBORNE: Can I just say, Congressman, that in
5 our view, there is an extremely effective way in which this
6 can be done, which would satisfy our own, I hope, fairly
7 stringent requirements for accountability.

8 MR. RITTER: Jack Wheeler, do you have a comment on
9 that?

10 MR. WHEELER: You can transfer food across the border in
11 the border areas, but in the far away areas, there is no way
12 to get it way up there, Herat, Ghour, that is a very long
13 ways away, and so I have to agree with what Lord Cranborne is
14 saying, that cash is the best thing. Besides, you promote
15 the local markets, and you can revitalize agricultural
16 activities. There is no market for surplus production when
17 you are getting bombed all the time, and the Mujahaddin do
18 not have money to pay for food. There is either complete
19 subsistence farming, or they leave.

20 Plus the fact that the Soviets are trying to pay very
21 high prices and entice the farmers to buy food, to sell their
22 food to them so they won't sell it to the Mujahaddin. Most
23 of the farmers don't want to do this, of course. But I mean,
24 when you are starving and you haven't got any money,
25 sometimes that is a real temptation.

1 Cash money is one of the easiest alleviations of this.

2 MS. KLASS: May I add the comment that relates to
3 getting food in and also medical aid? In this, I am afraid I
4 have to disagree with Jack here. I do not think it would be
5 a good idea to have large numbers of American or possibly any
6 American aid, personnel on the ground inside Afghanistan, and
7 that includes any extended medical missions.

8 The Afghan resistance people have told me again and
9 again, they don't want American personnel inside.
10 Journalists are another matter, they are more or less on
11 their own, as Mr. Lohbeck indicated.

12 But I would just put it to you gentlemen. Suppose you
13 had, and incidentally, medical teams and some aid teams would
14 have to include women because of the social structure of
15 Afghan society.

16 I would just put it to you that what position the U. S.
17 government would be in if a number of American medical
18 personnel were captured, and you can be sure that they would
19 be targets, as the French have been targets. What would be
20 the position of the administration and the government if we
21 had a number of American civilian hostages being held and it
22 were necessary to attempt to negotiate their release and
23 their safety?

24 MR. RITTER: I had one follow up question, and that is,
25 may we expect a kind of NATO or EEC cooperative effort on the

1 food aid question, whatever the mechanism is, to deliver?

2 LORD CRANBORNE: I would like to emphasize, if I may,
3 the importance of the voluntary nature of this effort. I do
4 not believe that it would be politically expedient in the
5 first instance, in the initial phase, for a government
6 national effort inside Afghanistan, and that includes
7 cooperation with the government.

8 There is a difference, perhaps an over-subtle one,
9 between government support of voluntary organizations and
10 direct government involvement. I do recall in this context
11 that way back in 1956, I think I am right in saying,
12 President Eisenhower handled the Hungarian question in what
13 seemed to be a very effective manner. I think he appointed
14 somebody called Tracy Voorhees to act as a coordinator for
15 the voluntary effort and to help the Hungarian refugees in
16 the United States.

17 It might be possible for some mobilization of the good
18 will, both in Europe and in the United States, to take place
19 in the same way which would involve not a direct government
20 involvement but a government endorsement. Certainly, one of
21 our principal areas of activity is to try and coordinate with
22 similarly-minded bodies in other countries with the United
23 States and in Europe and increasingly elsewhere to see how we
24 can cooperate.

25 I think it is also important, if I may, Congressman,

1 just to say one other thing: we have got to realize that
2 this is the Afghans' own war. It is their struggle, and they
3 don't want us to take it over from them. They have
4 experience in fighting this war. They know how they want to
5 do it.

6 Our job, in the voluntary organizations, I would
7 suggest, would be to support them in the way we think most
8 effective.

9 I think that that, again, is an important distinction to
10 draw.

11 MS. KLASS: May I just add a word to that? I have
12 served as coordinator for the Afghan Relief Committee, with
13 the European committees, and there are several governments in
14 Europe which are already doing or are preparing to do
15 something of this sort in the way of humanitarian aid, and
16 they also are preparing or are doing it through their private
17 voluntary organizations. We are sort of coordinating.

18 MR. RITTER: Inside Afghanistan?

19 MS. KLASS: This is aid inside, that goes inside
20 Afghanistan, but they are for the reasons that Lord Cranborne
21 just pointed out, doing it through the private committees in
22 their own countries. In terms of their giving psychological
23 support or political support or quiet support, they will be
24 with us, not in opposition to us.

25 LORD CRANBORNE: Could I just add one other thing?

1 MS. KLASS: There is also a member of DBC--

2 MR. RITTER: Lord Cranborne?

3 LORD CRANBORNE: So sorry. We are all horrified by what
4 happens there. We can only give practical expression if we
5 can mobilize public opinion. I don't know what it is like in
6 this country, but certainly our public opinion is horrified
7 by human tragedy elsewhere.

8 Now, isn't it much better not to make this a political
9 thing, but to make it what it really is, a public response to
10 a human tragedy? And so long as we keep it on that level,
11 then I think the aid will be more effective and will be less
12 open to political manipulation by anybody.

13 MR. RITTER: Jack Wheeler, did you have something?

14 MR. WHEELER: Oh, just a comment on that medical
15 situation. Bob Simon will be here, of course, to testify on
16 that. I may have a difference of opinion, but to my
17 knowledge, the French doctors do not have surgical teams
18 inside. While certainly it is the Afghan's war, there, and
19 we can encourage trained Afghan doctors to be inside
20 Afghanistan, there aren't very many of them. Just sending
21 aid across is not going to cut it. We are going to have to
22 send in doctors if we want to take care of people inside.

23 Eisenhower's aid may have helped refugees, but he didn't
24 do too much to the people resisting Soviet oppression inside
25 Hungary. That is what we are talking about. We are talking

1 about helping people resist Soviet imperialism inside
2 Afghanistan. To do that, we just cannot set up any barriers
3 to Americans who want to go inside and help, particularly
4 those of particular skills that are desperately needed such
5 as medical surgeons.

6 MS. KLASS: I was referring to the resistance' request
7 that we let the Europeans continue to provide the personnel
8 and let them go in, because the cost, if there is a problem,
9 the political cost is lower.

10 But I think that Antoine can probably say something more
11 about that. I think you do have surgical personnel in there,
12 don't you?

13 DR. CROGAN: We have two surgical teams in Afghanistan
14 in two different regions, in Badakhshan and in Kandahar. But
15 I would like, if you will give me permission, to tell you one
16 thing. I would like to compare the situation to the
17 Ethiopian situation, what happened in Ethiopia. In Ethiopia
18 you have the both sides, the government and the Torean side.
19 What you can see on the governmental side, I mean, on the
20 side where the population cannot escape, you see exactly the
21 movie of the ABC, what you have seen.

22 I mean, 40 percent of the population have lost 20
23 percent of their weight according to their height. It is a
24 definition. You have a famine or starvation when more than
25 10 percent of the population have lost 20 percent of their

1 weight. It is a definition. In the government side, you can
2 see 40 percent of the population who have lost that weight.
3 So you can see on the movie. You can see when you do a movie
4 these things.

5 We are in the century of the seeing or not seeing. If
6 you don't see, you can't prove. It is not now. What has
7 happened on the other side. You have got 40 percent of the
8 population who have lost that weight. You have around 10 or
9 15. But you have one other thing: that this population,
10 from which we can escape in Sudan and 400,000 people escaped
11 who have fled from Ethiopia to Sudan.

12 So the population, the Afghan population have that
13 choice, and all the middle, I mean, all the population of
14 Afghanistan who are quite near the Pakistan border, they can
15 escape into Pakistan. So all this population before, more
16 than 10 percent of starvation, 10 percent of the population
17 who starve, they are in Pakistan. So you cannot see a lot of
18 swelling babies or very thin. You cannot see that.

19 But it is a policy of the Soviet forces, Soviet
20 strategy, refugees are not consequences of the war, they are
21 the war: made refugees. This is very important. When you
22 can find that kind of starvation, I mean more than 10 percent
23 of the population who have lost 20 percent of their weight,
24 is on the isolated area of Afghanistan where you cannot go.
25 This is very, very important.

1 MR. RITTER: I think that is a very good point.

2 Mr. Chairman?

3 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Dr. Crouan, what is the position of
4 the French government about French nationals going into
5 Afghanistan?

6 DR. CROUAN: They let us, that's all. And their policy,
7 I mean, when they want to say that French population of
8 France help Afghanistan, they sue the French in private
9 organizations and where they have other observers in front of
10 them, I mean diplomacy, et cetera, they say they are doing
11 nothing. We serve the French both policy. But they never
12 give us any things. We have asked a meeting, a rendezvous to
13 Mr. Mitterrand three months ago, and we were not received at
14 all, yet.

15 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Rosanne, what is Freedom House, just
16 for the record? What is the purpose of Freedom House?

17 MS. KLASS: Freedom House is a private, independent,
18 non-governmental organization which was founded in 1941 to
19 support the extension of democracy and to help resist the
20 extension of tyrannies of all kinds anywhere in the world.
21 It is non-partisan; it does not accept government, any direct
22 government funding, and it examines the situations around the
23 world where democracy and freedom are in danger.

24 We have been called a left wing organization by some and
25 a right wing organization by others. So I guess we are doing

1 something right.

2 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Do you all smoke those terrible
3 cigarettes?

4 (Laughter.)

5 MS. KLASS: No, just a couple of us. I'm sorry.

6 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Can we add Freedom House to the list
7 of other organizations which have appeared before this
8 Committee which feel that the Soviets are deliberately
9 pursuing a policy of starvation?

10 MS. KLASS: Yes, I think you can, both Freedom House and
11 the Afghanistan Relief Committee.

12 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: What about Lord Cranborne? Do you
13 have objections to the use of the word genocide? Did you not
14 use that word?

15 MS. KLASS: Yes, I did. I think what is going on fits
16 the, some of the definitions of the genocide convention, but
17 I would agree with him in the sense that the Soviets' purpose
18 is not to wipe out the population.

19 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Just that they don't care if it
20 happens.

21 MS. KLASS: But they don't care if it happens. They
22 wanted the territory, and whatever they have to do, they're
23 willing to do. It just doesn't matter. The Afghans are
24 totally irrelevant to them. They just happen to be in the
25 way.

1 MR. RITTER: By the way, Mr. Chairman, on that point, if
2 you might yield for a moment--

3 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Yes.

4 MR. RITTER: The term migratory genocide has been used.
5 I guess it fits, the shoe fits. I mean, if the alternative
6 is death by starvation or death by some violent means or
7 death by disease and therefore you have to flee in order to
8 escape death, the bottom line is that the nation ceases to
9 exist as a nation; the people are either dead or they are no
10 longer inhabitants of their former nation.

11 MS. KLASS: The genocide convention, I don't have it in
12 front of me, but it includes under the definitions of
13 genocide the destruction of a culture, of a people's identity
14 and so forth.

15 MR. RITTER: I think it would be overly sympathetic to
16 the Soviets to somehow let them get away with the absence of
17 characterizations of their efforts in Afghanistan, Mr.
18 Chairman.

19 MS. KLASS: I would also point out that this is not
20 entirely dissimilar to the Soviet policy, the transfer of
21 peoples, where within the Soviet Union, they have moved
22 entire peoples, usually up to Siberia. This is a transfer
23 that puts additional pressure on Pakistan, and I think one
24 thing we should be aware of is that Pakistan is very much a
25 target, and certainly, the Soviets are working to weaken our

1 support for Pakistan in a number of ways and to weaken the
2 situation of Pakistan.

3 But it certainly fits under the genocide convention.

4 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Lord Cranborne, if you were
5 Congressman Ritter or me, what would you do? What would you
6 suggest to our government we should be doing and how should
7 we do it?

8 LORD CRANBORNE: You tempt me strongly, Senator. I have
9 never aimed so high.

10 (Laughter.)

11 LORD CRANBORNE: I can think of lots of things I would
12 do.

13 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Tell us.

14 LORD CRANBORNE: Let me just try and instill a thought.
15 One, I would try and encourage the networks here to give us
16 much air time as possible to what is happening inside
17 Afghanistan. If an evening report of the war inside
18 Afghanistan is not forthcoming, it would be nice to feel that
19 the American public said, "Hey, what's happened." That's the
20 most important thing, and there is every evidence to show
21 that the Soviets do not like being labeled for what they are
22 doing, so let's try and label them.

23 The second thing is, I would concentrate my efforts on
24 trying to stimulate the introduction of humanitarian aid into
25 Afghanistan, properly researched and properly funded. In the

1 case of the food network, I think I ought to make it clear to
2 you, Congressman, that what we are talking about is the
3 establishment of a distribution network upon which we can
4 build and which can expand, and which, subject to periodic
5 checking up, will be able to work on its own. It is, if you
6 like, an adaptation of an existing system.

7 The third thing I would do is I would endeavor to make
8 sure that those governments who are interested for political
9 and humanitarian reasons combine in order to agree a scheme
10 of priorities for humanitarian and political action. It is
11 interesting and comforting to me that all those who go into
12 Afghanistan and come out again and begin to amass a certain
13 amount of experience and knowledge of the subject. However
14 different the point of view they may start from may be from
15 the others, they tend to come to very much the same
16 conclusions.

17 So that sort of coordinated approach, whether it is
18 western European countries and the United States, which is
19 much easier, or whether we are talking about Islamic
20 countries, as well, which could be more difficult, although
21 not impossible, in my view, that kind of cooperation is
22 possible.

23 The fourth thing I would do is I would mount a sustained
24 but subtle campaign at the United Nations. I know that my
25 friend Aubrey Eban, the ex-Foreign Minister of Israel, said

1 in his autobiography rather cynically, and I think rather
2 more cynically than perhaps he really means because as you
3 know, he is a great comic, that "The United Nations is
4 splendid because if you don't agree with it, you can ignore
5 it, and if you do agree with it, you can use it."

6 Well, I think we should use it, and the international
7 forum that it provides could be a very useful means of not
8 only providing information but coordinating the sort of
9 international help which I think would be effective.

10 MR. RITTER: Wouldn't this be a great project, if the
11 Chairman would excuse me for a moment, of our combined
12 western nations to really build the level of challenge and
13 debate within the United Nations if only to carry out Eden's
14 latter appraisal? It is dead silent these days on
15 Afghanistan.

16 LORD CRANBORNE: Well, every year, it passes a
17 resolution by an overwhelming majority, but I think that it
18 would be nice to see if we can build on that large majority
19 which recognizes the situation inside Afghanistan to see
20 whether we can't move it to take perhaps more specific
21 actions in order to help the situation. I certainly think
22 that it is interesting that those countries which have been
23 best known perhaps for their support of international aid to
24 the Third World, countries like Holland and Sweden, ED}
25 have, in the past, been very sympathetic towards a more open

1 discussion of what is happening in Afghanistan. I think we
2 should build on that feeling of good will.

3 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Thank you for those recommendations.
4 I certainly agree with every one of them. Incidentally, I
5 think we probably should have a separate hearing of this
6 committee to examine ways that we can improve international
7 cooperation.

8 MS. KLASS: May I add one, even though I am neither a
9 Member of the Parliament nor a Member of the Congress? Let
10 me say that the news of Afghanistan is broadcast over Voice
11 of America to Afghanistan and the area. But while the
12 Afghans are glad to know that the world is watching, they
13 really don't need to be told what is happening.

14 However, if one wishes to put diplomatic and political
15 pressure on the Soviet Union, it might be helped by making
16 sure that all the broadcasts to Latin America, to Africa, to
17 other parts of Asia to the so-called Third World, which are
18 the other targets, that VOA is broadcasting to them what is
19 happening in Afghanistan.

20 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Yes. That is an excellent
21 suggestion. As a matter of fact, I have already written to
22 the Director of the USIA in that regard.

23 I want to get back to the hunger and famine for my part.
24 How much will this cost, Lord Cranborne? Then I am going to
25 have some similar questions for other panelists also.

1 LORD CRANBORNE: Well, our pilot project is the best
2 research we can do. I think it is based, I think I told you,
3 on 20,000 families in one area around Peshawar, and that is
4 about 100,000 people, very roughly. We reckon that it would
5 cost, at present prices, the equivalent of 250,000 pounds
6 sterling, which is certainly the equivalent of \$250,000 these
7 days, in order to feed 1 hundred thousands people for a
8 month.

9 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: A month.

10 LORD CRANBORNE: About a third of that represents
11 transport. That involves sending money inside, and the
12 transport is for not transport for food to Pakistan, but for
13 distribution of food inside Pakistan in the network.

14 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: A quarter of a million dollars per
15 100,000 thousand people per month.

16 LORD CRANBORNE: Yes.

17 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Have you worked that out?

18 LORD CRANBORNE: Yes.

19 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: How much is it for the nation?

20 LORD CRANBORNE: What do you mean?

21 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: We don't want to address the problem
22 of 100,000 people.

23 LORD CRANBORNE: But the whole lot. I see that. I
24 would really refer you to what I have emphasized before. It
25 is no good saying just because 100,000 people will cost you

1 250,000 pounds dollars to feed in one part of Afghanistan.
2 It has to be 2 in another. That is where we come back to the
3 importance of research. I think every project in each area
4 has to be properly researched, and properly costed. That is
5 one of the reasons why we are so desperate to update Dr.
6 D'Souza's report and also to expand on it.

7 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: You have no educated guess on what
8 the annual effort would be for the entire country? If hunger
9 is now the greatest threat, the continuation of it to the
10 freedom fighters, and if that is what is occurring, indeed,
11 the world should be pressing on. What does it cost?

12 LORD CRANBORNE: I don't. I could give you a wild
13 guess, but it would be so far as not to be of any meaning.

14 MR. WHEELER: How does that cost compare to the cost of
15 transporting food donated from the outside and taken across
16 the border from Pakistan inside? Is it cheaper or more
17 expensive?

18 LORD CRANBORNE: It is very much cheaper to do it
19 inside. Let me give you an example.

20 MR. WHEELER: Even more food that is donated?

21 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: May I ask that the panelists not get
22 into a debate.

23 LORD CRANBORNE: These figures are a little bit out of
24 date now but ought to be about right. We reckon that it
25 would cost about 1,300 Afghanis per seer (unit of

1 measure)--and I will translate that into western language in
2 a minute--to transport wheat by means of a land bridge from
3 Pakistan into an area of need which we know about. It would
4 cost exactly a tenth of that to do it from a surplus area
5 inside Afghanistan to an area of need, about 130 Afghanis per
6 seer.

7 I think I am right in saying that a seer is about 7.1
8 kilograms, depending on which part of Afghanistan you are in.
9 I think I am right in saying that will be about 6 Afghanis.
10 It varies a bit to the Pakistani rupee, and there are about
11 17 rupees to the pound, so if you multiply 6 by 17, which I
12 can't do in my head, you get the answer.

13 MS. KLASS: 102.

14 LORD CRANBORNE: Thank you.

15 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Rosanne?

16 MS. KLASS: I'm sorry. I was just going to say that
17 another comparison might be the cost per capita of providing
18 food aid to those villages inside Afghanistan and the cost of
19 maintaining them as refugees in Pakistan.

20 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Do you know what that relationship
21 is?

22 MS. KLASS: I think that I have given a chart to your
23 assistant, Paul Young, that I did just on the basis of that,
24 some standard refugee reports.

25 But I think it is about \$60 or \$80 a year in Pakistan

1 per person, and that does not include the total aid; that is
2 just the basic aid. This would come out to about \$25 per
3 year. The figures you gave came out to about \$2.50 per
4 person per month, so that is \$25 or \$30 dollars a year, so it
5 is about half of that.

6 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: It is substantially cheaper to incur
7 that?

8 MS. KLASS: Yes, aside from everything else. There,
9 obviously, are other reasons to encourage them.

10 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Ookay. Same question I asked
11 Lord Cranborne. What would you have us do? If you were
12 Congressman Ritter or me, what would you have the government
13 do?

14 MS. KLASS: I think I would suggest your looking at the
15 recommendations that have been made this morning, which are
16 pretty consistent. For example, Jack and I may differ over a
17 particular technique, but basically, everyone is saying the
18 same thing: Get the aid in, and get it in fast. I would
19 look at those and see how they can be translated into action
20 and try to find the most effective and efficient channels
21 through which it can be done.

22 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: What does that mean, in plain
23 English? I mean, are there concrete, specific things that we
24 can take as recommendations to the White House, to the State
25 Department, to our colleagues in Congress?

1 MS. KLASS: I think, for one thing, that aside from an
2 allocation of aid given at a particular time, as was done
3 apparently some months ago, and incidentally, on that, my
4 sources are primarily the press. So I don't know how many of
5 the rumors in the reports are accurate, either. But I would
6 suggest that a foreign government report be established, not
7 just a one-shot appropriation and then bring up another
8 one-shot appropriation, but that the policy be established
9 that America is going to provide on-going, massive
10 humanitarian aid and that it be implemented pragmatically and
11 effectively.

12 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Which means the government provides
13 the money but at that point, has private organizations deal
14 with it.

15 MS. KLASS: Probably. Probably. Incidentally, one
16 problem is that the organizations which are working in
17 Pakistan had to make the decision whether to work in Pakistan
18 or to work inside because of the pressures the Pakistani
19 government is under. Those organizations would provide aid
20 in refugee camps, but cannot also do it inside.

21 There are a couple of organizations here in this
22 country, just a couple. One thing I didn't mention is that
23 in my various contacts with various European committees which
24 have on-the-ground operations in Peshawar, notably the
25 Swedish committee, the French doctors, the British--I

1 believe your committee is has set up an office and so on. I
2 have talked to them about the extent to which they could
3 expand their activities, and I think that within a relatively
4 short time expanded operations would be possible that we
5 would be able to get this in.

6 Also, in addition to the two resistance groups that Jack
7 mentioned, there are others which I have information that
8 they are fairly effective. I think if the area headed by
9 Monsier, the Galani (sic) organization has finally gotten its
10 act together and become well organized. There are others.
11 It would be possible before too long to find appropriate
12 channels and structures. If a long-range, large program of
13 aid were set up, then it might be useful for one of the
14 American organizations to establish an office in Peshawar to
15 work on this, although as I have said and as Lord Cranborne
16 and others have said, it may be more advantageous at some
17 times for us to utilize European personnel on the ground.

18 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Fine. Doctor Wheeler, same
19 question.

20 MR. WHEELER: Sure. Well, there is, of course, many,
21 many things you can do. One is not simply Rosanne's
22 suggestion of Voice of America, which is very well taken, but
23 the entire apparatus of USIA. Particularly one concrete
24 thing would be exposing not just the situation in Afghanistan
25 but the virtual war that the Soviet Union has made in Islam.

1 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Great potential.

2 MR. WHEELER: And focsing on, I mean, the tyranny and
3 the lack of religious freedom that Islamic people in the
4 Soviet Union possess, as well. There are 50 million Soviets
5 moslems, the fifth largest moslem population in the world,
6 and it is certainly the most oppressed moslem population in
7 the world.

8 Here is an opportunity for America and moslem countries
9 to join together and to oppose the continuing religious
10 oppression that the Soviet Union has visited upon the moslem
11 population in their own countries.

12 There are a number of things that you can do regarding
13 State Department policy in Pakistan. As I said, it is policy
14 for any personnel in the consulate in Peshawar or the embassy
15 in Islamabad to not talk to an Afghan. If Abdul Haq or
16 anybody else wanted to go in and talk to them, they won't
17 talk to them. That has got to stop. This whole sham of
18 plausible deniability has just got to come to an end.

19 So I think that there has got to be--

20 MR. RITTER: Is this a relatively recent phenomenon?

21 MR. WHEELER: Not to my knowledge. It has been going on
22 for a long time.

23 MS. KLASS: From the beginning.

24 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Since they they instituted the State
25 Department there.

1 (Laughter.)

2 MS. OAKLEY: May I make a point of record? I am Phyllis
3 Oakley from the Afghanistan desk, and I will talk to Jack.
4 It's just not true.

5 MR. RITTER: I have had a numbers of contacts with
6 people who did work for the State Department who did have
7 some contact.

8 MR. WHEELER: You talk to an Afghan, and he will tell
9 you, "I went in there. They won't talk to me." I am not an
10 Afghan and I am not at the State Department, and have said,
11 "Please talk to me." It has been reported to me, "Jack, why
12 won't they talk to us?"

13 That is what I know. I will just report those instances
14 of people of Mujahaddin coming to me and saying, "Jack, what
15 is going on? I go to the consulate, and they won't talk to
16 me. They tell me that why won't they talk to me. They tell
17 me, it is our policy not to."

18 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: If the State Department would
19 provide us with ~~answers~~^{answers}, we could explore these things more
20 effectively.

21 MR. WHEELER: I don't want to disagree with Phyllis.
22 That is what the Mujahaddin I know have told me.

23 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Continue with your recommendations.

24 MR. WHEELER: Again, I think this has not been brought
25 up, but there are many Mujahaddin that I know that I have

1 talked to that say that the situation is hopeless in
2 Peshawar; that the corruption is too endemic; that too many
3 Mujahaddin are just losing a lot of hope and optimism with
4 the present structure. That is why I think to some extent,
5 the situation has got to be bypassed.

6 Whatever is happening to aid that is being spent there
7 now, I don't know, but I think that a large portion of it is
8 ending up in the pockets of leaders of the Mujahaddin
9 organizations in Peshawar. I will just say that flat out.
10 That is my own opinion. I have just heard this too many
11 times from too many Mujahaddin. I think we ought to deal
12 with the ones who have a reputation for honesty and
13 effectiveness, and that is primary Rabanni and Khalis; not
14 limited to them exclusively, but primarily; and start dealing
15 directly with the people inside, the people who are fighting
16 inside. Whatever is happening to all the help and assistance
17 that is being sent now, it is not getting to the people
18 inside.

19 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Do you have records?

20 MR. WHEELER: The only way to do that that I can see is
21 to deal with people who we know are not corrupt in Peshawar
22 and try to have some kind of different situation other than
23 the situation that has developed now. There will be no unity
24 between these leaders in Peshawar because their egos are on
25 the line, and if there is unity, it will be a diminution of

1 their own personal power. It is a very corrupt situation;
2 nobody wants to talk about it, but it has got to change if
3 there is to be effective aid.

4 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Do you have any recommendations with
5 regard to addressing the hunger problem?

6 MR. WHEELER: Well, I think that the points that the
7 Viscount made are very well taken. I think that we have not
8 got an Ethiopian situation on our hands. It is not mass
9 starvation going on in Afghanistan. There is a potential for
10 it. It is spotty; the policy of the Soviet Union is to drive
11 the people into being refugees. But the people don't want to
12 be refugees, and they want to stay and fight. They want to
13 resist; they want to remain free. You have got a people here
14 who are very special. They are not afraid of the Soviet
15 Union. They will continue to resist whether they help them
16 or not.

17 They are going to. Either we help them or many of them
18 are going to stay and die. We have got a threat, and we can
19 help avert the potential of famine which is, I think, a clear
20 point that is being made now.

21 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Thank you. Let me ask the same
22 question of Dr. Crouan. Do you have specific recommendations,
23 particularly with regard to nutrition and medicine, doctor,
24 that we could take up with our government?

25 DR. CROUAN: No. All the persons I have told made other

1 recommendations. I just want to say over the past five
2 years, we worked, and that is all. Really, we hope that
3 people continue to be there. We need to dare, to dare to do
4 humanitarian things, but humanitarian actions is not actions,
5 so we need to dare just to see the problem. We need to spend
6 time and really, it is a serious problem. Really it is a
7 war, an actual war here. It is a problem that we let them
8 die or not. That is all. We work. If other persons have
9 organizations who wants to help us, that is okay. It would
10 be the recommendation.

11 MR. RITTER: I would like to thank the panelists. I am
12 left with an impression that it costs \$60 to feed--I mean, I
13 don't know what the exact numbers are, but let's say it costs
14 the same to feed the people in the refugee camps as it would
15 to feed people inside if we can develop the proper mechanisms
16 and transfer. It really should be our policy, starting
17 today, to feed the people inside Afghanistan and not wait
18 until they get out.

19 MR. WHEELER: Yes.

20 LORD CRANBORNE: Yes.

21 (Applause.)

22 MS. KLASS: Can I add one other note? We now begin to
23 have the most population in this country, and we have very
24 important concerns with the entire moslem world. Our
25 experience with Iran has been most unfortunate. I think that

1 many people in this country don't know there is any
2 difference, that one moslem is another moslem. Our own
3 moslem citizens are very concerned and unhappy about this.
4 It would begin to indicate, a significant program of American
5 aid would begin to indicate to that entire, very large moslem
6 world that we can differentiate; that we don't see everybody
7 as wearing the same face and that we understand their
8 differences and are prepared to assist them individually.

9 CHAIRMAN HUMPHREY: Thank you, each. I think it has
10 been helpful. It is, I know, particularly for our friends
11 who are Afghans and supporters of Afghans, a very
12 frustrating process, but that is the way it works. We have
13 to keep doing these things to keep it before the public
14 opinion in this country and around the world. We are going
15 to keep at it.

16 Thank you all.

17 (Applause.)

18 (Whereupon, at 2:35 p.m., the Committee was recessed
19 subject to the call of the Chair.)
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